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Abstract 
 
Civil rights commemorative boulevards are an increasingly important method of 
framing African American community revitalization and persistent historical 
inequities.  Often underlying planning efforts to revitalize segregated African 
American neighborhoods, these boulevards are one important change 
mechanism for realizing equitable development and challenging structural 
racism.  This thesis demonstrates the central importance of these 
commemorative boulevards in framing redevelopment and maintaining 
community resolve during the long struggle for revitalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Orleans Civil Rights Movement; civil rights commemoration; 
revitalization; urban planning; structural racism; urban history; Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Boulevards; community-based planning; redlining; racial 
zoning; public housing; African American commercial districts. 
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 If we really are about the business that [Dr. King] was about and have the agenda 
that he had, then we would do things to improve the life of the people who he was 
concerned with. And that‟s what I‟d like to see happen on these streets named in 
his honor.  They should be change mechanisms1  
 
1 
Introduction 
 
 The story of revitalization in Central City, New Orleans began over 40 years ago with civil 
rights commemorative boulevards as a central strategy to overcome a history of racial segregation 
and economic discrimination.  In order to understand the commemorated boulevards of today we 
must carefully analyze the “creation” of Central City—one of New Orleans‟ hypersegregated African 
American communities2—within an historical perspective.  Continued planning efforts in Central 
City, and the urban planning discipline, will benefit from a broader analysis on how structural racism 
impacts the revitalization of the community.  
 Structural racism—whereby the interactions between institutions over time create durable 
inequalities3—inhibits the individual and community aspirations of minorities. African American 
communities, in particular, are linked by a shared history of slavery, unrelenting racism and perpetual 
struggles for equality.  For generations, African Americans engaged in campaigns to ensure civil and 
human rights, enduring immense adversity in efforts to undo segregation.  Even with triumphant 
legal and legislative victories, the Civil Rights Movement failed to dismantle the insidious structural 
forces preventing the full integration of African Americans into American society.  These structures 
were embedded in tools for urban development since the turn of the 20th century. 
 White segregationists combined housing, commercial, and job market discrimination in a 
potent racist cocktail to keep African Americans in “poverty or deliberately impoverished” after the 
fall of slavery.4  Beginning in the early 20th century, land use, zoning, lending, and real estate practices 
embedded racist valuations into neighborhood development and formed enduring patterns for 
segregating residential and commercial economies.5  Under Jim Crow conditions, African American 
                                                 
1 African American Resident of Miami, FL, as quoted in the film, MLK Boulevard: The Concrete Dream, Two-Tone 
Productions, Directed by Marco Williams, 2003.  
2 Denton, 2006 
3 Grant-Thomas and Powell, 2006; Grant-Thomas and Powell, 2008 
4 Fredrickson, 2002, p. 101 
5 Freund, 2007; Massey and Denton, 1993; Immergluck, 2004 
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entrepreneurs struggled to finance businesses and create viable commercial corridors.  In housing 
markets, the combined effects of redlining, zoning, and land use planning prevented African 
Americans from entering one of the largest economies and strongest means to develop household 
wealth.6   And when looking for employment opportunities in a rapidly expanding industrial 
economy, African Americans were systematically denied higher paying private sector jobs.  The 
interactions between these institutional practices created African American communities that are not 
“treated as part of regional economies and, instead, are treated as separate, independent 
economies—that is, ghettoized—[which] can largely be attributed to racism.”7  The cumulative 
effects of excluding African Americans in the broader housing and job markets play a significant 
role in persistent poverty by concentrating jobless and unskilled people who are hemmed in by strict 
color lines.  The result of these structures at the neighborhood level can diminish the ability of 
African American communities to stabilize and revitalize long after legalized segregation.  After the 
fall of Jim Crow, African American leaders searched tirelessly for ways to overcome persistent 
economic inequality, leading to shared experiences and some common strategies to challenge the 
structural impediments in American society.  
 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 8 galvanized the Civil Rights Movement and became the symbol 
of the struggle for civil and human rights for millions of African Americans.  After Dr. King‟s tragic 
assassination in 1968, and in recognition of national and local struggles for justice, communities 
across the country renamed streets to commemorate his legacy.  Over time, this was accompanied 
by the commemoration of other national and local leaders of the Civil Rights Movement.9  There are 
now approximately 900 streets (from now on referred to as MLKs) named after Dr. King, the 
majority of which are located in the South.10  Regardless of whether MLKs are prominent 
boulevards, commercial corridors, or country roads, they are often referred to as the “Black Main 
Street,” connoting a shared history and experience in American society.11   
 Although the renaming of streets is of increasing importance to African Americans publicly 
honoring their history and struggles during the Civil Rights Movement, commemorations are 
marked by decades of racial and political tensions that limit where and how the past is memorialized.  
Civil rights commemorative boulevards are often restricted to segregated African American 
                                                 
6 Freund, 2007; Oliver and Shapiro, 2006 
7 Ross and Leigh, 2000, 371 
8 When referring to Martin Luther King, Jr., himself, this study will use Dr. King. 
9 Dwyer, 2000; Dwyer and Alderman, 2008a 
10 Alderman, 2011; Michelson et al., 2007 
11 Tilove, 2003; In Central City, the term “African American Street” is also used.  
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communities, acquiring stigmas that affect investment decisions in the neighborhood.  In many 
cases, the fight to rename streets further divides an already racially segregated community.12     
 Despite the limitations placed on MLKs, community leaders around the country are actively 
looking at ways to revitalize commemorative boulevards.  By renaming streets, African American 
leaders challenge political, residential, and economic structures as a means to claim public space for 
their own history and redevelopment.  Directly linking the commemoration of civil rights struggles 
with battles against inequities in jobs, housing, and business development for African Americans, 
many neighborhoods are looking to revitalize “African American Streets” and incorporate them into 
the larger economy.13  If navigated strategically, commemorative boulevards can be a powerful and 
positive tool that can attract investment and planning attention for the neighborhood.   
 There is a distinctive rise in the commemoration of civil rights leaders as a tool for economic 
development and heritage tourism.  As a new “growth industry,” heritage tourism offers a potential 
avenue for local economic development and a means to share the community‟s historical culture.14  
As a means of developing the heritage “infrastructure,” commemorative boulevards have the 
potential to invite reinvestment.  Using tools like anchor institutions, mixed-income housing 
redevelopment, and culture-based art and performance centers, community leaders continue to plan 
for Central City‟s “turning point” towards revitalization. Nonetheless, these initiatives suffer from 
persistent structural racism, fragmented planning efforts, and potentially inequitable distribution of 
benefits to the community.   By placing Central City‟s plans for revitalization within a historical 
context of structural racism, this study analyzes civil rights commemoration as a vehicle for 
dismantling segregation in an African American community. 
 It is the intention of some African American leaders to rename streets in honor of the Civil 
Rights Movement to keep the conversation about justice alive.15  At times, this commemoration can 
seem to work against the neighborhood as it evokes the vitriol of some white communities, which 
can reinforce the structural barriers in private lending institutions.  Moreover, commemorative 
boulevards also draw out open conflicts over memory and history within the local African American 
leadership and raise questions about what is most important for the community.  The true challenge 
                                                 
12 Mitchelson et al., 2007; Dwyer and Alderman, 2008a 
13 Schleifstein, Mark, “Many hope the first financial institution in a generation to set up shop on Oretha Castle Haley 
Boulevard is a sign of the area‟s rebirth,” The Times-Picayune, December 11, 2004; Ross and Leigh, 2000 
14 Inwood, 2010; Dwyer and Alderman, 2008a 
15 Dwyer and Alderman, 2008a 
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of these commemorative campaigns for revitalization is whether they can deliver on the long list of 
generational demands for justice.   
 Commemoration may also raise more questions than it answers.  Should the streets look a 
certain way, be in a particular place, and transcend race and class divisions?  What does revitalization 
really mean when used in conjunction with civil rights commemoration?  Does commemoration of 
African American history encourage reinvestment or further racism and segregation of residential 
and commercial economies?   Street renaming after civil rights leaders provides a high-mark for 
community organizations to live up to, bringing enduring optimism and also persistent frustration 
with planning for revitalization.  It is with a clear understanding of the structures inhibiting 
revitalization that commemorative campaigns can achieve even greater impacts.  This thesis offers a 
compelling reason to include a historical analysis of structural racism in relation to commemoration 
and how to move revitalization and planning efforts towards greater equity for African American 
inner city communities.   
 Civil rights street commemoration is one of many vital ingredients in the concerted effort to 
revitalize Central City.  Alone, commemoration adds to the rich tapestry of memory written in our 
urban landscape, but it does little to overcome residential segregation or the structures of the 
economy.  However, when commemoration is used in conjunction with revitalization, it can serve as 
a “change mechanism” to integrate history and living culture with strategies for reinvestment and 
equitable development.  Honoring the civil rights leaders that fought against segregation and 
structural racism is a valuable asset in the revitalization of a community, one that provides a versatile 
foundation for framing redevelopment decisions during the ongoing struggle for justice in African 
American communities.   
 
Overview of Chapters 
 This thesis orients the history of Central City around the major historical and federal policy 
trends that affected the development and perpetuation of structural racism.  The second chapter 
begins with a brief history of Central City, New Orleans and the limitations on African American 
enterprise under Jim Crow.   It analyzes the development of tools for segregation—primarily racial 
zoning ordinances, racially restrictive covenants, redlining, and public housing—that developed 
long-term structures in housing finance, economic development, public policy, and land use 
planning.   
 5  
 The third chapter focuses on Central City during the Civil Rights Movement and the federal 
programs that developed as a response the national urban crisis of the 1960s.  Central City civil 
rights leaders challenged the structures of segregation, while at the same time using the War on 
Poverty and Model Cities programs to begin organizing for a revitalized neighborhood.  Out of the 
turbulent time period, Central City developed African American political and community leaders 
who led the struggle to commemorate streets in honor of civil rights leaders during the 1970s-80s.   
 The fourth chapter focuses on the evolving strategies to revitalize Central City.   Arising 
from the long-term efforts of organizations located in the neighborhood, campaigns for 
revitalization are directly influenced by Central City‟s civil rights history and the relevance of living 
culture.  By placing the decades of revitalization strategies in Central City within the context of 
structural racism, this chapter investigates how revitalization efforts struggle to overcome historical 
inequities and integrate African American communities into the larger economy.  Additionally, this 
chapter and the conclusion (chapter 5) offer insights on how Central City and the planning discipline 
could benefit by using a broad historical analysis of civil rights commemoration, structural racism, 
and revitalization in segregated communities. 
 Although this study paints a broad perspective on the links between civil rights 
commemoration, revitalization, and structural racism in Central City, there are limitations of the 
analysis.  The perspectives of the people that live and work in Central City, especially the residents 
themselves, could not be fully represented in this thesis.  It is the hope of the author that future 
research will try to expand the scope of this work to understand the relationship between resident 
and community-based organizational perspectives on civil rights commemoration in Central City.  
Although this study uses considerable archival research materials, secondary literature was invaluable 
to assist with the research for this thesis.  By tying together archival research, secondary literature, 
and interviews with Central City leaders, this study adds to the literature on urban planning, MLK 
Streets, structural racism, and civil rights history of Central City, New Orleans.  
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2 
Laying the Structural Foundation for Central City 
 
 New Orleans‟ history as an integrated city changed profoundly over the course of the 20th 
century.  Between 1900 and 1940, a profusion of new concepts and tools in land use planning, 
zoning, and the real estate profession affected neighborhood development and racial segregation in 
cities throughout the United States.  These early mechanisms for segregating neighborhoods 
undergirded housing finance, federal policy, and public perceptions by the 1930s.  Central City, New 
Orleans experienced all of the national trends for segregating African Americans during this 
formative period of metropolitan development.  
 Persistent racial disparities arose from these institutionalized structures in real estate, housing 
policy, and land use planning.  By using a structural racism perspective, this chapter “emphasizes the 
powerful impact of inter-institutional dynamics, institutional resource inequities, and historical 
legacies on racial inequalities today.”16 The cumulative effects of excluding African Americans from 
housing and job markets played a significant role in concentrating jobless and unskilled people in 
segregated communities hemmed in by strict color lines.    By intent, segregation limited “the access 
that [African Americans] have to resources and economic opportunities…[so] that most of those in 
the stigmatized category are either kept in poverty or deliberately impoverished.”17  It is precisely 
because of the powerful structural interactions between housing and job discrimination that 
segregation and poverty are maintained over generations.  The effects of these structures in Central 
City diminished the ability for African Americans to stabilize and revitalize their community long 
after de jure segregation. 
 This chapter begins with a brief history of the neighborhood that became known as Central 
City.  It positions Central City directly within the national structures that solidified residential and 
economic segregation. These areas will be developed separately, but throughout this thesis I will 
show how housing and economic discrimination work in structural unison—aided by individual and 
institutional acts of discrimination—to restrict African Americans‟ access to political power, job 
opportunities, and capital.18  
                                                 
16 Grant-Thomas and Powell, 2008, p. 119 
17 Fredrickson, 2002, p. 101 
18 Grant-Thomas and Powell, 2008 
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Uptown, the Backswamps, and the Tragic Irony of the Integrated Dryades Street Neighborhood 
 Long before Central City was known as such, the area upriver from the French Quarter and 
the Central Business District was part of the growing Uptown.  The Mississippi River to the south 
and dense cypress swamps to the north confined the Uptown neighborhoods to a sliver of high 
ground.  The French engineer and architect Barthelemy Lafon commissioned the original plan for 
this neighborhood in 1806, incorporating grand boulevards, residential squares, markets, and even 
drainage canals.19 Lafon named the streets parallel to the boulevards after the nine Greek Muses, 
including Melpomene—the muse of singing and tragedy (a portion of which later became Martin 
Luther King Jr. Boulevard).   Lafon also named one street Dryades, refering to tree nymphs in a 
whimsical reminder of the bordering cypress swamp (a portion of which later became Oretha Castle 
Haley Boulevard).20 
 Racial disparities in housing began with the earliest designs for the neighborhood.  Wealthy 
whites owned elegant properties along the regal boulevards. African Americans—most of whom 
were slaves at the time—were relegated towards the least desirable land bordering the swamps.21  
This area was known as the “backswamps” and condemned its inhabitants to the cheapest housing 
options available.  By design, “blacks were pushed into the demi-land on the inland margin of the 
natural levee, where drainage was bad, foundation material precarious, streets atrociously 
unmaintained, mosquitoes endemic, and flooding a recurrent hazard.”22  Without a boulevard on the 
back end, the swamps hemmed in Central City and prevented development until mechanized 
pumping started in the early 20th century.   
  The development of canals and the concomitant immigrant influx from the 1830s onward 
dramatically changed the nature of Uptown New Orleans.  Waves of immigrants from Ireland, 
Germany, and other European countries flooded into the area, with the final major influx of Eastern 
European Jews, who made up a significant portion of the population well into the 20th century.  The 
synchronous introduction of immigrant labor with the construction of the Melpomene and New 
Basin Canals in the 1830s brought new tenement structures built by speculators in rapid succession 
                                                 
19 Hastings, 2004 
20 For more information on the naming history see Hastings (2004) and Chase (2001) 
21 Lewis, 2003; Spain, 1979; See Campanella (2006) for maps on the distribution of free people of color and slaves in 
New Orleans.  Higher concentrations of slaves were present in the Uptown area, as opposed to the three -tiered racial 
castes of the Downtown neighborhoods, characterized by a racial hierarchy of Whites, Creole free people of color, and 
slaves (Hirsch, 1992).  
22 Lewis, 2003, p. 52 
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to house the growing working class, both African American and white.  Likewise, after the Civil 
War, an influx of rural African Americans freed from the bonds of slavery migrated into the 
neighborhood and it became known as an area for Protestant, rather than Catholic, African 
Americans.23  During this time, the area around Dryades Street became more integrated, less wealthy 
and more of a reflection of the city‟s ethnic and racial diversity.  Even with the constant influx of 
immigrants, the neighborhood remained relatively stable, although the majority of the property 
owners in the area were either wealthy Americans or ethnic whites.24  
 Although racial tensions flared at times, there is evidence to show that the integrated 
neighborhoods around Dryades Street were fairly stable until the end of the 19th century.  A riot in 
1900 in the neighborhood sparked white mob violence against African Americans in the area, but 
apparently did not lead to more rioting or any short-term effects on residential segregation.25  
Despite the relative calm of racial tensions, African Americans—now freed from slavery—continued 
to suffer from the effects of living in the backswamps, consistent housing shortages, constraints on 
jobs, and limited access to homeownership as compared to the ethnic whites.  As a result, the 
Dryades Street neighborhood began to concentrate more unskilled workers and the housing density 
dramatically increased.  By one account, the housing density in the Dryades Street Neighborhood 
nearly doubled between 1900-1920.26     
 In addition to relatively stable residential neighborhoods, Central City also contained one of 
the most successful commercial corridors in the city—Dryades Street. Bartholemy Lafon‟s plan for 
the Dryades area planted the seed for this corridor‟s early success.  Lafon designed the Dryades 
Street Market at the corner of Dryades and Melpomene, which after opening in 1849 offered fresh 
produce and meats well into the twentieth century.27  The Dryades Street commercial district 
surrounded the market, offering a thriving hub of commerce for the integrated neighborhood that it 
served.  Dryades Street offered opportunities for immigrants to build wealth and establish a niche in 
the larger New Orleans culinary and retail economy.28  At the turn of the twentieth century, Dryades 
Street also hosted some successful African American businesses, including three insurance firms and 
                                                 
23 Rogers, 1993 
24 Hastings, 2004 
25 Ibid; The riot is known as the Robert Charles Riot of 1900, and it involved a shoot out between an African American 
man, Robert Charles, and police officers.  In retaliation, white mobs attacked African American residents in Central City.   
26 Ibid, p. 63 
27 Medley, 2001 
28 Hastings, 2004 
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a newspaper, along with a stretch of service industries.29  Due to the segregated shopping along 
Canal Street, the city‟s main commercial corridor, Dryades Street businesses greatly benefited from 
serving the African American clientele with limited options for retail and personal services.30  
 Although Dryades supported an integrated shopping district, the survival of African 
American businesses depended on access to capital, which was significantly limited under Jim 
Crow.31 Although there were several African American-owned businesses along Dryades, the 
majority of businesses were owned by ethnic whites, primarily Jews.  Central City‟s integrated 
commercial and residential patterns resulted in a less dense African American commercial district 
than in other southern cities at the time, which diffused economic power and prevented wealth 
accumulation within the African American business community.  In addition, there is no evidence of 
African American banks along Dryades or anywhere else in New Orleans area at the time.32  Thus, 
Central City did not enjoy “employment and circulated capital in the black community, thereby 
creating economic growth” as in other southern cities like Atlanta, Richmond, and Memphis.33  
 Within a few decades after the turn of the 20th century, most of the thriving African 
American businesses apparently disappeared.  One Jewish merchant who was on Dryades since the 
1940s recalled that he “didn‟t know of any black shopkeepers.”34  This situation is not unique to 
Central City because “the history of black business development in the United States is inextricably 
linked to the history of social and economic development of blacks more generally in this country.  
Occupational, legal, and de facto segregation as well as slavery severely limited income and wealth 
generation for blacks.”35 Therefore, for generations, the structures of business development limited 
the development of African American commercial activity and caused many to shutter, as they 
struggled in an environment of constant discrimination.36  
 As African American businesses closed along Dryades, the opportunities for decent jobs 
diminished.  Dryades Street supported a vibrant integrated mix of businesses owned by whites that 
catered to the African American population, but did not hire them above menial jobs.  The 
                                                 
29 Ingham, 2003; Medley, 2001 
30 Medley, 2001 
31 Immergluck, 2004 
32 LaViolette, 1960. 
33 Ingham, 2003, p. 664 
34 Hannusch, Jeff, “Dryades Street Merchant,” Times Picayune Dixie, December 13, 1981. 
35 Immergluck, 2004, p. 53 
36 See Immergluck (2004) for a thorough analysis of the history of banking, lending, and African American business in 
America.  Also see Butler (2005) and Oliver and Shapiro (2006) for a history of African American entrepreneurship and 
the limits on African American wealth accumulation under Slavery, Jim Crow, and persistent racial inequalities in 
business. 
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combined effect of job discrimination and limited capital for African American businesses had 
dramatic affects on Central City as Dryades Street and the surrounding neighborhood became more 
segregated.  The widespread job discrimination aided in the development of New Orleans‟ ghetto, 
especially with increased unemployment for African Americans in the 1950s.  However, it was this 
job discrimination, as I will show in the next chapter, that also led to some of the most ambitious 
and successful protests and boycotts in New Orleans during the Civil Rights Movement.   
 
The Long-Term Structural Effects of a Thwarted Racial Zoning Ordinance 
 Zoning arose at the turn of the 20th century as a way to protect and enhance property values 
by literally segregating incompatible land uses, thereby keeping unsafe or unpopular uses away from 
residences or commercial properties.  The early progressive values of the planning tool changed 
when zoning advocates, realtors, and suburban developers shared the belief that the presence of 
African Americans—rich or poor—could affect property values. In 1910, Baltimore passed the 
nation‟s first racial zoning ordinance, which attempted to segregate whites and blacks just as it would 
keep rental housing and single-family homes separate.37  The practice quickly spread through 
American cities—even in the North and West—but much of the zeal for racial zoning took place in 
the South, where “early zoning advocates believed in racial hierarchy, openly embraced racial 
exclusion, and saw zoning as a way to achieve it.”38  In a rapidly expanding New Orleans during the 
1920s, segregationists identified racial zoning as another Jim Crow strategy for the subjugation of 
African Americans.39   
 Racial attitudes towards residential segregation changed rapidly in the 1920s.40  At a time 
when new mechanical pumps allowed for the draining of swamps to build middle-class 
neighborhoods, whites exerted more racial intolerance over the potential for integration in newly 
developing areas of the city.41  An ally of the realtors and developers that espoused newly forming 
racial housing economics, the white supremacist media in New Orleans fueled racial tensions by 
reporting on the “invasions” of African Americans into white neighborhoods in northern cities like 
Chicago, which reportedly led to violence and lowered property values.42  Much of this rhetoric 
developed in the 1910s-1920s, as zoning advocates and the real estate profession created the market 
                                                 
37 Silver, 1996 
38 Freund, 2007, p. 46 
39 Silver, 1996, p. 32 
40 Hastings, 2004; Thomas and Ritzdorf, 1996 
41 Hastings, 2004 
42 Times Picayune, “Race Segregation Ruling”, March 15, 1927, page 10. 
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conditions and the rationale for segregating neighborhoods.43  In New Orleans, this pressure did not 
single-handedly segregate the historically integrated neighborhoods, but it laid the structural 
foundation for de facto segregation that impacted New Orleans long after de jure segregation was 
defeated. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court‟s decision to ban racial zoning did not stop New Orleans‟ officials 
and residents from enacting an ordinance of their own.  In 1917, the Supreme Court prohibited 
racial zoning ordinances in Buchanan v. Warley, finding that these types of ordinances denied the “full 
use of property” merely from a “feeling of race hostility.”44   Unsurprisingly, segregationists in the 
South ignored the ruling and continued to press for racial zoning ordinances, reasoning that it was 
within the purview of Jim Crow to segregate neighborhoods just like public accommodations.45 The 
New Orleans City Planning Commission, first in the South, was created in 1923 in part to pass a 
racial zoning ordinance and “evade the ruling of the Supreme Court.”46  The Louisiana Legislature, 
aware of the power of zoning to segregate races and armed with strong segregationists from 
northern rural parishes, passed a law in 1924 that mandated all cities over 25,000 people to segregate 
neighborhoods by race.47  New Orleans complied in “exactly one week” by passing a racial zoning 
ordinance and recruiting a well-known urban planner by the name of Harland Bartholomew.48   
 The effects of the racial zoning ordinance would have had sweeping effects on the integrated 
neighborhoods in New Orleans.  Landlords would not be able to rent to people of another color 
unless residents of the neighborhood signed petitions in support of it—an unlikely feat in light of 
growing racial animosity.  Homeowners would not be able to renovate or make additions to their 
property if they were out of compliance with the zoning code.  As seen in Birmingham, which was 
the only city with a racial zoning law on the books until 1951, the zoning ordinance could have a 
“significant impact” on segregating neighborhoods.49  
                                                 
43 Freund, 2007 
44 As quoted in Silver, 1996, p. 31 
45 Silver, 1996; Connerly, 2005 
46 Silver, 1996, p. 34 
47 Act 118, Senate Bill No. 119, introduced by Mr. McConnell, Papers of the NAACP (microfilm collection), Part 5: The 
Campaign against Residential Segregation 1914-1955, Reel 2, Frame 625; Hirsch, 1992 
48 Hirsch, 1992, p. 268; Also see Connerly (2005) and Silver (1996). The advocates for the New Orleans Planning 
Commission were by no means unanimous in their decision to pursue a racial zoning ordinance.  According to Hastings 
(2004), immediate dissent from the NAACP and African American leaders was also joined by some white progressives, 
such as Charles Favrot, an outspoken defender of comprehensive zoning and planning and part of a Chamber of 
Commerce interracial relations committee.  
49 Connerly, 2005, p. 49 
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 Reactions from the African American community swiftly brought the racial zoning 
ordinance to court.  Although the Downtown Creoles and Uptown Protestants rarely worked 
together on previous civil rights campaigns, the racial zoning sparked a newly shared sense of racial 
solidarity.  The NAACP raised several thousand dollars to wage the legal battle that ultimately 
resulted in the successful overturning of the racial zoning ordinance.50  The defendant in the case 
was Benjamin Harmon, an African American man who was trying to convert his single cottage to a 
double51—a common building type in New Orleans that, if curtailed, could have limited the ability 
for African Americans to expand upon their properties and create an additional income source.  
 The City of New Orleans defended its case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  As in 
other Southern cities, New Orleans‟ white elite advocated zoning and comprehensive planning as 
another “Jim Crow strateg[y]…to transform the racially integrated Southern city into [a] bifurcated 
racial world.”52   The Times-Picayune argued along with the city in support of the ordinance, 
claiming that race “invasions have wrought disaster to property values, while aggravating racial 
bitterness and provoking violent breaches of the public peace” and that the recently upheld Euclid v. 
Ambler decision legitimized zoning for segregating races.53  New Orleans lawyers also argued that the 
ordinance was legal under the separate but equal logic of Plessy v. Ferguson, as the ordinance‟s design 
prevented integration in both African American and white neighborhoods.  On March 14, 1927, the 
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance without any consideration of Plessy in their opinion. The 
Court‟s opinion merely stated: “Reversed on the authority of Buchanan v. Warley.”54 Thus ended the 
legal use of racial zoning in New Orleans.    
 Although the racial zoning ordinance lasted only a few years on the books, produced no 
maps, and brought few people to court, it had a significant impact on race relations in New Orleans 
and the Central City neighborhood.  Until the passage of the zoning ordinance in 1924, no notable 
instances of racial violence had occurred in Central City since the Robert Charles riots of 1900.  
Shortly thereafter, several bombings targeted African American businesses and residences on the 
fringes of Central City, bordering white neighborhoods.55  Apparently there were no subsequent 
bombings, but the message was clearly sent to the African American community, as in other cities, 
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that individual acts of violence could be used when institutional tools for segregation were not 
legal.56   
 Real estate professionals in New Orleans pursued alternative mechanisms for controlling the 
minority “invasion” even before the ordinance was struck down.  After the ordinance suffered its 
first defeat by Judge Cage in New Orleans, the Moran brothers—“real estate agents of considerable 
experience”57—outlined a plan to segregate neighborhoods without legislation.  Termed the “Moran 
recommendation” by The Times-Picayune, it advocated for a committee composed of the Real 
Estate Agents Association, the Insurance Exchange, the City Homestead League, the General 
Contractors Association, the Contractors and Dealers Exchange, and the Louisiana Bar Association 
to:  
Specifically denote residential areas for whites and colored.  Such ones 
established, the next step will be for individuals and associations who perform 
any of the functions incidental to ownership to subscribe to pledge not to 
participate in any transaction in which either white or colored would attempt to 
obtain residence in any section reserved for the opposite race.  The real estate 
man would decline to sell or lease, the lawyer to examine title, the notary to 
pass the act, the insurance man to protect, the architect to design or remodel, 
and the homesteads to grant loans, where any such invasion would be 
intended.  Cooperation along these lines would be more effective than formal 
law, and public opinion would enforce the decisions….The outcome would 
guarantee that both races in New Orleans would continue to reside here in 
peace and tranquility58 
Even with the defeat of the racial zoning ordinance, realtors knew that public and private 
cooperation was “more effective than formal law.”  The Moran recommendation was an act of real 
estate collusion against the entry of African Americans into the housing market, which significantly 
impacted the ability of Central City residents to secure a mortgage, as shown in the subsequent 
section.   
 Although the racial zoning ordinance did not succeed in New Orleans, the effects of zoning 
and land use planning achieved some of the segregationist‟s vision of hemming in African American 
neighborhoods.  Hastings (2004) analyzed maps over several decades following the passage of the 
city‟s first zoning ordinance in 1929.  Commercial and residential developers in the Central City area 
successfully negotiated commercial buffer zones that had the intended effect of concentrating the 
African American community within well-defined areas.   In addition, Central City was one of the 
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many African American neighborhoods in New Orleans to suffer the consequences of interstate 
highway development, which razed communities and contained the segregated residential 
communities both physically and psychologically.59 And so, even without a racial zoning ordinance, 
affluent whites structured the zoning code and the “planning process in the service of apartheid.”60  
 The types of actions seen in New Orleans during the 1920s played out across the nation as 
the Supreme Court struck down racial zoning in one Southern city after the next.  “The movement 
toward legally sanctioned housing segregation ended, and thereafter racial segregation in southern 
cities was accomplished by the same means as in the north: through violence, collective anti-black 
action, racially restrictive covenants, and discriminatory real estate practices.”61 Whites in New 
Orleans were far more successful segregating neighborhoods using these other racist methodologies. 
 
Racially Restrictive Covenants & Redlining 
   The language and logic of zoning inspired powerful real estate professionals and lenders to 
develop methods for segregating New Orleans‟ neighborhoods.  Influenced in part by racist zoning 
advocates and economists who believed in the “market imperative” of housing segregation, realtors 
incorporated racist methods into their appraisal of housing markets.  These theories postulated that 
the presence or “invasion” of minorities, primarily African Americans, irreversibly led to 
neighborhood decline and property value losses.   By 1924, the National Association of Real Estate 
Boards (NAREB) codified their racial bias of neighborhood decline in their code of ethics, 
“prohibiting realtors from moving African Americans into white neighborhoods.”62  By the 1930s, 
the segregationist theories of NAREB and real estate economists became a primary tool in federal 
housing policy during the largest expansion of homeownership in the history of the nation.63  The 
first tool for racial segregation used by real estate professionals, however, was the racially restrictive 
covenant, a document that forbade owners of property indefinitely from selling the property to 
people of color.   
 In 1909, the Gentilly Terrace Company developed the first racially restricted development in 
New Orleans in the newly drained swamps towards Lake Pontchartrain.  The advent of the 
mechanical pump and the growing popularity of restrictive covenants coalesced into a radical new 
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tool for confining African Americans to existing neighborhoods, and allowing for whites to move 
freely to the suburbs.64  In Central City, African Americans were constrained by restrictive covenants 
on the northern portion of the neighborhood, as evidenced in zoning documents from the 1920s.  
The Louisiana Realty Company declared to the zoning commission that it “imposed its own 
regulations in the form of racially restrictive deeds on its tract along Louisiana Parkway north of 
Claiborne Avenue.”65 These early restrictive covenants in New Orleans dramatically shaped the racial 
demographics of New Orleans‟ expanding neighborhoods, but their effects paled in comparison to 
the structural restrictions placed on African American homeownership by mortgage lenders and the 
federal government.  
 During the Great Depression, new methods for expanding homeownership and controlling 
foreclosures arose concomitantly with new forms of discrimination in the housing market.  In 1933, 
the federal government created the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) with a single task in 
mind—to purchase bad mortgage loans and refinance them as long-term, low-interest rate, fully 
amortized loans.66  Tragically, the HOLC also developed the racist language, biases and economics 
of the real estate profession into federal policy.67  The HOLC‟s simple equation for homeownership 
came with the “argument, first codified by economists and realtors, that racial discrimination was 
not a matter of ideology or personal preference but of economics.”68  In coordination with the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the HOLC developed the first federal appraisal system for lending 
to homeowners based on perceived lending risk.  With the creation of four color-coded categories to 
designate neighborhoods by risk, the national system of redlining became federal policy.  Category 
D, which was coded in red and termed “hazardous,” was attached to “virtually every majority-black 
or racially mixed neighborhood” and systematically denied federally insured mortgages.69  The 
HOLC created the first “Residential Security Maps” redlining neighborhoods in New Orleans, 
which were “widely circulated throughout the lending industry.”70  As shown in Figure 2a, Central 
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City—with the exception of a small area of wealthy homes along Baronne and Carondelet Streets—
is contained entirely within a redlined area.  Thus, the HOLC‟s system for preventing investment in 
African American communities directly impacted Central City beginning in the 1930s.   Much as the 
Moran recommendation envisioned in the 1920s, government officials, banks, realtors, and 
developers denied housing to African Americans based on race. 
 
Figure 2a. HOLC Residential Security Map of New Orleans (detail), Circa 1930s.  Central City is marked in red by the 
location D-2 to the left of center.  Central City‟s triangular boundaries are Louisiana Avenue to the West, Earhart to the 
East, and St. Charles to the South. Full New Orleans map shown in Appendix A.  Map located in the cartographic and 
architectural holdings at the National Archives in College Park, MD. 
 
 As the HOLC‟s stop-gap solution proved that refinancing loans could stabilize some of the 
housing market, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) took the reins and vastly changed the 
urban form in America, and the racial landscape with it.71  The FHA perfected the language of racial 
exclusion in its Underwriting Manual and expanded its use to all facets of the private mortgage lending 
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markets. “Because of this interdependence, the lenders of noninsured mortgages adopted the same 
racial proscriptions that guided FHA appraisal and lending activity,” which essentially normalized 
and codified redlining in housing markets across the country.72  The FHA map in Appendix B, when 
compared to the HOLC redlining map, clearly shows that redlining affected the major suburban 
building activities in New Orleans.  All private suburban housing developments, bolstered by FHA-
insured mortgages, avoided redlined neighborhoods in the city.   
 As the federal government continued to influence suburban housing markets in the 1940s 
and 1950s, the effects of redlining spread through all of New Orleans.  In the Post-World War II 
environment, redlining magnified the process of segregating neighborhoods, increased racial 
turnover, and also exacerbated poverty in Central City: 
The racially discriminatory underpinnings of the federal credit policies had the same results 
in New Orleans as in the rest of the country.  Years later, a municipal assessor recalled that 
„10,000 GI‟s returned to New Orleans ready to settle down.  And they could not get a 
mortgage in central city, the Irish Channel, the Lower Garden District [the older sections of 
the city with historically racially mixed population patterns].  Many of these men went to the 
new subdivisions in Gentilly or Jefferson Parish‟….Moderate-income white families found 
apartments in attractive new developments, often built with federal mortgages.  No such 
options existed for blacks.73 
Whereas the ethnic whites in the Dryades Street neighborhood were able to move to the suburbs, 
African Americans in Central City could not become homeowners, whether they left or stayed.  
“The white market is preferred by builders because of its stronger and more varied housing demand, 
fewer difficulties of selling and financing, and greater abundance of good building sites.”74  One of 
the only opportunities for African American residents to obtain a mortgage was with African 
American lending institutions—primarily insurance companies—but their capital reserves were far 
less and there was reportedly little enthusiasm from residents to invest in the institutions.75  
  Working in conjunction with redlining, racially restrictive covenants further hindered 
mobility for African Americans.  This practice continued into the 1950s in New Orleans, as 
covenants openly denied private market housing to middle-class African Americans who wanted to 
live in the city‟s expanding suburban communities.76  After considerable controversy and political 
maneuvering, one African American suburban development was built, called Pontchartrain Park, 
which was for the African American elite in New Orleans.  It was off limits for a vast majority of the 
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African American population in the city, especially the underemployed or working class of Central 
City.77  Even though the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited racially restrictive covenants in 1948, the 
FHA and suburban developers continued to use them until realtors found other tactics for racial 
exclusion.78  As a result, only the most affluent African Americans in New Orleans could enjoy the 
suburban lifestyle spreading throughout the metropolitan region.   
 Housing discrimination—especially as a result of FHA redlining—drained Central City of 
stability and wealth.  As late as the 1970s, many in Central City “found it impossible to obtain a loan 
from a bank or homestead.”79  Central City‟s few homeowners consequently could not obtain loans 
to keep their homes up to code.  Renters, on the other hand, suffered from the presence of 
slumlords that contributed to blight and neighborhood decline, and sent clear signals to lending 
institutions to further redline and disinvest in the neighborhood.80  As a result, “the fact that 
federally subsidized „private‟ housing was closed to blacks was one of the factors increasing black 
ghettoization during this period.”81 Overcrowding, wealth-building constraints, unemployment, and 
deepening poverty all factored into the growth of residential ghettos developing across the United 
States as suburban developments were off-limits to African Americans and inner city neighborhoods 
were redlined by mortgage lenders and the government.82  As a result, many neighborhoods were 
stripped of stability and much of their middle-class constituency, while also limiting the gains in 
equity for African Americans homeowners.  These generational problems resulted largely from 
public and private housing market discrimination.83 
In response to widespread complaints of housing discrimination, several studies were 
conducted in New Orleans on redlining.  The Urban League found widespread discrimination and 
logged grievances against the FHA, VA, and real estate agents.84  Another study found “covert racial 
discrimination among realtors and lending agencies.”85  As late at 1978, New Orleans Mayor Ernest 
Morial called “redlining a „considerable problem‟ in New Orleans.”86  These studies, however, did 
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not stop the practice of covert discrimination, nor did they spur reinvestment in Central City.  By 
the time that the FHA increased their lending to African American communities and the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 required banks to lend to disinvested communities, Central 
City‟s population was deeply poor and could not obtain traditional mortgage products.   
The most insidious reason for the continued presence of redlining and housing 
discrimination is that mortgage markets veil racial inequities in economic terms.  “FHA operations 
began to racialize whites‟ vision of housing economics during the 1930s, as the agency‟s story about 
race, property, and housing was rapidly inscribed in a very powerful state apparatus, whose 
representatives insisted that it was economics and the market, not individuals and their prejudices, 
that were setting the rules.”87  This national economic context is relevant to New Orleans, as the 
“Negro cannot expect much from the building industry on economic grounds alone.”88  This 
structural logic of racialized economics continues to underpin the mortgage finance system even 
today.   
 
Public Housing and Central City’s Official Segregation 
 New Orleans‟ public housing was segregated from its inception and stayed so throughout its 
entire history.  Nearly defining residential segregation, public housing was one of the most powerful 
forces eroding the traditionally integrated neighborhoods in the city and played a significant role in 
the structural constraints that prohibited African Americans from building wealth and rising out of 
poverty.89  
 Central City hosted some of the first public housing developments in the United States.  In 
1937, Congress passed the Wagner Act, providing the first stable funding source for public housing 
and criteria for site selection, slum clearance, and tenant eligibility. Remarkably, the Wagner Act 
provided for a non-discriminatory hiring policy for the construction of public housing, a fact that 
was uncommon in the New Deal job programs.90  Federal officials, however, allowed local housing 
authorities to segregate the housing units themselves.  New Orleans was the first city to receive 
funds for public housing, and began the process of site selection and slum clearance with 
exceptional speed after receiving funds in 1938.  The first two projects identified and built were the 
St. Thomas development in the Irish Channel for whites and the Magnolia development in Central 
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City for African Americans. The neighborhood selected for the Magnolia development housed a 
diverse array of African American communities, ranging in quality from tenement slums to the 
middle-class homes of African American doctors and professionals.  Within 36 days, the Housing 
Authority of New Orleans (HANO) evicted all of the 862 households in the footprint of Magnolia.  
These evictions began the mass exodus of the African American middle-class from Central City.91 
 Following the opening of Magnolia, African American leaders pushed the Housing 
Authority of New Orleans (HANO) to create public housing management jobs for African 
Americans.  After initial negotiations for management positions, the HANO “board rapidly proved 
unable to live with this arrangement….After some debate, they passed a new resolution specifying 
that blacks would be employed in management at Magnolia…but that both projects would now be 
grouped „under the supervision of a Management Supervisor…of the white race.”92   White 
supremacist pressures continued in HANO, leading to the same policies of job discrimination for 
supervisors, interviewers, and field workers in connection with tenant selection.  Thus, not only 
were the projects‟ residents segregated by race, only whites staffed higher management positions for 
decades.93   
 Despite the segregation of public housing and job discrimination, public housing seemed to 
be highly regarded by the residents. Many of the African American residents in public housing even 
exceeded the income quota built into the 1937 Wagner Act‟s regulations and there seemed to be a 
higher level of payment stability in African American public housing than in white developments.94  
Many residents held stable jobs as unionized longshoremen, which had some of the highest wages 
that working-class African Americans could earn at the time.95  In addition, progressives in New 
Orleans ensured that the public housing was aesthetically pleasing, a rarity under the Wagner Act‟s 
austere funding guidelines.96  Even the growing unease among African American leaders about the 
future of residential segregation did not dispel the general sense that “the segregated housing 
projects of New Orleans came closer to true equality than most public institutions ruled by the 
„separate but equal‟ doctrine.”97   
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 After World War II, public housing in New Orleans changed rapidly with the enforcement 
of income quotas at a time of growing housing shortages.  HANO evicted stable tenants with jobs 
to make way for a long list of eligible tenants, many of whom were poor, jobless, and unskilled 
migrants from rural parishes.   As described in the previous section, widespread housing 
discrimination in the private rental or homeownership market prevented the evicted African 
Americans from obtaining housing.  White tenants, on the other hand, could obtain mortgages or 
move freely in rental markets.  Thus constrained, many ventured to available units in downtown 
neighborhoods that were experiencing rapid racial transition.  Those left in Central City with eligible 
incomes could also now live in two more public housing developments built between the 1940s-
1960s—Calliope (or B.W. Cooper) and the Guste (“High Rise” and “Low Rise”), both of which 
bordered Melpomene (later MLK).  Thus the combined effects of income quotas and private 
housing market discrimination played a large part in Central City‟s shift from a relatively stable 
working class community into a racially segregated and chronically underemployed ghetto.98   
 In 1965 New Orleans‟ public housing was legally desegregated, but it was entirely segregated in 
reality.  Nearly all residents across the city in public housing were African American.  “Whites simply 
did not need public housing as much as blacks did.  By 1969, in the New Orleans metropolitan area, 
only 8 percent of whites lived below the poverty line, and most of these were outside the city limits.  
In contrast, almost 40 percent of blacks lived below the poverty level, and most of them were in 
Orleans parish.”99  A large contributing factor besides the housing discrimination in the rapidly 
expanding suburbs of the 1960s was that “Blacks remained excluded from participation in the 
economy.”100  The inter-institutional structures of the housing and job markets in New Orleans were 
firmly in place:    
Through war and recovery, new wards and recessions, through social 
transformation, through civic modernization, the whites found the projects 
to be a path upward and, in general, the blacks did not.  There was a wall 
surrounding those housing projects.  It was not of the Housing Authority‟s 
making.  If it was invisible, it has proved tremendously hard to penetrate 
nonetheless.101  
This so-called invisible wall is the structural constraints of the discriminatory housing market, the 
white suburban color line, job discrimination, and other ways of constraining African American 
mobility in the inner city. 
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 By the 1960s, Central City reflected the “ghetto” conditions of African American 
communities throughout the country, characterized by “large, impoverished, spatially constrained, 
and racially segregated residential communities.”102 The deleterious effects of ghetto and underclass 
life are well documented,103 but it is important to note “Racial segregation—and its characteristic 
institutional form, the black ghetto—are the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation 
of black poverty in the United States.”104  The segregation of African Americans in Central City—
particularly through the concentration of underemployed people in public housing—formed one of 
the most enduring structural ghettos in New Orleans (Racial concentrations in Central City shown in 
Figure 2b).  
  
Figure 2b. Racial change in the Central City area of New Orleans from 1940-2000.  Size of circles connotes density of 
people in census blocks.  As this figure shows, Central City‟s population shrunk dramatically between 1940-2000.  
Reproduced with permission by Campanella (2006, p. 275) 
 
After decades of wrangling with HANO over hiring African Americans for management, 
both Magnolia and Calliope were handed over to resident management organizations in the 1970s, 
“which held substantial promise of improving organization and internal community atmosphere.”105  
However, with Central City already in a cyclone of decline, the changes followed the adage „too little, 
too late.‟  Even with “changing political power structures…the structural forces which had turned 
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public housing in this direction ran deep in every American city.”106  These structural forces aligned 
economic discrimination and private housing discrimination into a powerful force that kept Central 
City in a state of deepening poverty, which would not relent for decades. 
                
Conclusion 
Discrimination in public and private institutions caused decline in African American 
business, zoning inequities, redlining, and public housing concentration in Central City.  These 
institutional interactions affected housing investment decisions, economic development, and the 
mobility of African Americans in a rapidly segregating city.  Although early civil rights attorneys and 
leaders successfully overturned many of the zoning ordinances, the structures for private and public 
housing discrimination were well established and continue to the present day.   All of these factors 
played a role in the developing African American response to segregation during the Civil Rights 
Movement, but they also limited the gains made by African Americans as they broke the bonds of 
Jim Crow. 
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The ghetto and barrio have replaced Jim Crow as the symbols of racism, and the struggle to 
radically reconstruct the inner city built environment has become the postmodern equivalent 
of the Civil Rights Movement.107  
 
3 
Reclaiming the Streets: The Civil Rights Movement in Central City 
  
 The Civil Rights Movement challenged and overcame institutionalized Jim Crow laws that 
prevented African Americans from expressing the fullness of their political rights.  However, the 
movement struggled to overcome the fundamental structures in housing, jobs, politics, education, 
and economic development.  Central City hosted many of the civil rights activities in New Orleans 
during the 1950s and 60s, but it also suffered from some of the most extreme effects of segregation 
and persistent structural racism.   Since the turbulent 1960s, African American leaders in Central 
City searched tirelessly for ways to overcome structural restraints, one of which tied civil rights 
commemoration to the revitalization of the neighborhood. 
 After Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.‟s assassination, African American leaders commemorated 
the civil rights struggle by naming streets in his honor, followed by the commemoration of local civil 
rights leaders.  Although the renaming of streets is of increasing importance to African Americans 
publicly honoring their history and struggles during the Civil Rights Movement, commemorations 
are marked by decades of racial and political tensions that limit the location and scale of the street 
renaming.  In Central City, as in cities around the country, political battles restrict commemoration 
to less prominent boulevards or streets that remain within segregated African American 
neighborhoods.  The result is that the boulevards are often stigmatized, or “branded,” with 
attributes of an African American ghetto that affect the neighborhood‟s redevelopment potential.108  
Moreover, the commemoration of civil rights leaders brought out struggles between powerfully 
connected historic preservationists—who held deep beliefs in maintaining their version of New 
Orleans history—and civil rights leaders who envisioned a new landscape and political order for the 
community and the city.  The political structures in New Orleans ensured that commemorative 
streets would not cross into the affluent white parts of the city, affecting both the location and scale 
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of the civil rights commemoration and further demarcating the economic and racial segregation of 
Central City.109 
 This chapter begins with an account of the civil rights activities in Central City that 
challenged Jim Crow and the structures that prevented African Americans from full participation in 
our democracy and economy.  The chapter transitions into the politics of commemorating the Civil 
Rights Movement in Central City and how leaders tied newfound political power to neighborhood 
revitalization efforts.  In so doing, Central City leaders battled against the political and structural 
limitations of commemorating the Civil Rights Movement after the fall of Jim Crow.  
 
The Civil Rights Movement in Central City, New Orleans 
 The Civil Rights Movement is often equated with the legislative successes of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  There is often less 
recognition of the struggles for jobs, housing, and equitable economic development that 
accompanied these monumental changes to American domestic policy.  For several decades, African 
American civil rights and union leaders gauged their full integration into American society by the 
ability to secure jobs, adequate housing, and an equitable share of federal resources.  Martin Luther 
King, Jr., himself, learned early in his career the importance of jobs and housing, and later came to 
ardently support a platform of “full employment” and “open housing” for all citizens.110  Despite the 
successes of the Civil Rights Movement, the realization of full employment and open housing was 
truly a dream.  In reality, low-income African Americans found little consolation in the federal jobs 
programs during the 1960s and housing policy since 1968.111  Time and again, civil rights leaders 
organized protests and boycotts in support of fair employment, jobs, and decent housing for African 
Americans, but each time the structures of the discriminatory job and housing markets obstructed 
them.  In Central City, decades of struggle for jobs and housing produced few well-paying jobs and 
scant decent housing.  Nonetheless, the neighborhood‟s activism also produced some of the first 
demonstrations in New Orleans that were critical for the desegregation of public accommodations 
and pressured city officials to address some of the job and housing concerns over the decades to 
come.   
                                                 
109 Mitchelson et al, 2007; Dwyer and Alderman, 2008a 
110 Jackson, 2007 
111 Massey and Denton, 1993 
 26  
Most of New Orleans‟ prominent civil rights leaders of the first half of the 20th century were 
Creole elites from the Downtown neighborhoods.  Many Creole leaders practiced law for the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and fought against Jim 
Crow laws, such as the racial zoning ordinance described in Chapter 2.  The Civil Rights Movement 
in New Orleans took a distinct turn in the 1950s, however, in the Uptown neighborhood of Central 
City with the rise of forceful Protestant ministers and a budding militant student population.112  
One of the most prominent civil rights leaders in New Orleans was a Protestant minister in 
Central City by the name of Reverend Abraham Lincoln Davis.  Rev. A.L. Davis (Davis), as he was 
known, was beyond simple categorization.  Born in rural Louisiana, Davis became one of the most 
prominent Uptown Protestant ministers in the city.  Moving to New Orleans in 1936 at the age of 
twenty, Davis showed himself to be a forceful voice for civil rights.  Davis was an activist minister at 
a time when activism was not popular in the church.  In addition to his vocal criticism and public 
protesting during the Civil Rights Movement, Davis showed considerable skill as a racial 
negotiator—a fact that often got him criticism because of his shaky alliances with white racial 
moderates.  Davis was also very politically active, which helped him win influence, but eventually 
caught him in struggles with African American opponents increasingly frustrated with the pace of 
change in Central City.113 
In 1955, the Montgomery bus boycott pressured that city‟s segregation policies and led to 
one of the most successful economic boycotts and one of the most high-profile court cases of the 
Civil Rights Movement.  This massive local demonstration of unity catalyzed other boycotts around 
the country, inspired innumerable African Americans to stand up to the oppressive conditions of 
Jim Crow, and launched the career of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.   The actions in Montgomery 
greatly inspired A.L. Davis, so much so that he hosted Dr. King and 100 other Southern civil rights 
leaders on February 14, 1957 at his New Zion Baptist Church in Central City.   At this meeting, the 
attendees voted to create the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which would 
become one of the most powerful and effective civil rights organizations in the decade to come.   
“Initially conceived as a means of capitalizing on the success of the Montgomery bus 
boycott…SCLC‟s founding gave a stimulus to protests against bus segregation in Louisiana.”114  Just 
a little over a year after SCLC‟s founding, Davis and other leaders successfully and peacefully 
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integrated the New Orleans bus system on May 30, 1958 through a “friendly lawsuit”—a surprising 
victory that did not require major mobilization and was a mild antecedent to the virulent reactions of 
whites to integrating schools and public accommodations during the 1960s.115   
When court-ordered school desegregation began in 1960, whites reacted violently in New 
Orleans.  Mothers of white children threatened and attacked four African American girls who were 
the first children to enter an all-white school in the Lower 9th ward, which at the time was a working 
class white section of town.  This incident received national attention and quickly changed the 
perception of New Orleans as being a racially moderate city.  The process of school desegregation in 
New Orleans also followed similar patterns seen around the country, where whites fled public 
schools and African Americans were left with an inferior education system and decrepit schools—
directly impacting generations of African Americans in finding employment and other opportunities 
that white counterparts enjoyed.116   
In these increasingly tense times of race relations and desegregation, civil rights leaders in 
Central City organized the first major boycott in New Orleans (Figure 3a).117  Although Dryades 
Street was the primary African American shopping district, the white businesses notoriously did not 
hire African Americans to work jobs above the menial level.  In response to widespread 
discriminatory hiring practices along Dryades Street, several activist Protestant ministers and lawyers 
from the surrounding neighborhood—including the Reverend A.L. Davis—organized into a group 
called the Consumer‟s League.  As one of the original organizers of the boycott recalled: 
After fruitless negotiations with the Dryades Street merchants, the group threatened to 
demonstrate.  The merchants‟ answer, Mitchell recalled, was, „Go on ahead.  Demonstrate, 
and march all you please.  You‟re not gonna keep the black folks off Dryades Street.‟ The 
Consumers‟ League challenged the merchants, and „we organized the first march that I can 
remember in the city of New Orleans for civil rights.‟118    
On the other side of the counter, the predominantly Jewish merchants recalled the situation 
somewhat differently.  Dryades Street merchant Lestor Gerson “[Shook] his head in recalling the 
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incident. „We had a bad situation that existed between the merchants and the NAACP, because they 
wanted an immediate change from stores with all white employees, to black and white.‟”119   
 The Consumers League galvanized the historically divided African American community by 
organizing Protestant ministers, residents, congregation constituents, Creole lawyers, and students 
from all over the city to boycott the white business owners.  The boycott started at the beginning of 
April of 1960.  Within days, many of the businesses saw profits drop as much as $3,000.120  By May 
of 1960, boycott leaders counted as many as 30 newly-hired African Americans on Dryades Street.121    
 
Figure 3a. Dryades St. Boycott, 1960. New Orleans Public Library City Archives 
 
Several young students were deeply influenced by their experience in the boycott on Dryades 
and the increasingly radical actions of students across the country. Several students in particular—
Oretha Castle, Rudy Lombard, and Jerome Smith among them—formed a local chapter of the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 1960.  CORE organized a racially diverse group of students 
to perform sit-ins and demonstrations on Canal Street to challenge segregation at the heart of the 
white power structure. Rather than being “centered in the black community, led by ministers and 
doctors…[t]he sit-ins downtown were different. „To talk about hiring some black clerks in stores in a 
black neighborhood was one thing, but to start talking about social change, social life, going to the 
same restaurants, was considered to be really radical,‟” one civil rights leader recalled.122  Despite 
physical intimidation and numerous arrests, students repeatedly pressed the white political and 
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business leaders to integrate all public accommodations.123 Integration of public accommodations 
was guaranteed with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but white businesses still persisted in 
their segregation of certain private facilities.   Not until 1969, when the New Orleans City Council 
passed a strict local Public Accommodation Ordinance expanding the 1964 Civil Rights Act‟s scope, 
did public accommodation segregation officially end.124  
Even with integrated public accommodations, the hiring of African American employees in 
white businesses did not continue as smoothly outside of the Dryades Street area.  As noted in the 
previous chapter, higher-level management jobs were strictly segregated by race in New Orleans.  
This job segregation also applied to the city‟s civil service employees and most private employment.  
These conditions significantly affected the ability of African Americans to build wealth and climb 
out of poverty like their lower-class white counterparts. “Segregation and social exclusivity deeply 
affected economic options.   With a few exceptions for professionals and small business owners, 
black residents usually represented a low-cost labor force that served others, rarely with access to the 
real sources of economic, and therefore political, power.”125  These acts of discrimination in the job 
market amounted to willful economic racism and systematic exclusion, keeping African Americans 
unemployed or in low-wage jobs and thus in a perpetual state of poverty.   
The deepening condition of poverty in African American communities was well known to 
leaders in New Orleans, but they were also on the agenda of national leaders, including Dr. King.   
King knew that “low southern wages were „not an accident of geography‟….Historically confined to 
unskilled jobs, black workers were vulnerable to structural unemployment….This was not simply a 
paradox of poverty amid plenty.  American abundance structured black poverty.”126  Sharing this view, 
Oretha Castle argued, “this country is a deeply racist country.  In some ways, I think that is the 
root…the economic system, and, in some ways, the political system builds on and translates that.  
The root problem of this country is that it‟s racist to the core.  Every day this country is becoming 
more and more regressive, with the economic system becoming more and more oppressive.”
127
  
Civil rights leaders, by tying together a trenchant analysis of segregation and economic deprivation, 
forcefully expressed the structural relationship preventing African Americans from truly gaining 
freedom from racism and poverty.  
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In New Orleans, civil rights leaders maintained pressure on political elites to ensure jobs for 
African Americans. In August of 1963, after years of working tirelessly to get the city of New 
Orleans to hire African Americans, A.L. Davis and other leaders announced that they reached a deal 
with the city that would remove racially discriminatory signs on city property, „refrain from 
appealing‟ court orders that desegregated local institutions, hire applicants to the civil service on the 
basis of „qualifications‟, hire black firemen and sanitation workers, and the city would „refrain from 
harassing businessmen who desire to desegregate hotels, motels, restaurants, and other facilities.‟128  
By September, civil rights leaders realized that the demands would not be met on their terms.  Six 
civil rights groups organized the “Freedom March” from Shakespeare Park in Central City to City 
Hall on September 30, 1963—a little more than a month after the March on Washington—that 
drew between 10,000 and 15,000 people and was considered the largest demonstration of its kind in 
New Orleans‟ history.129   Among others, the Reverend A.L. Davis and Oretha Castle led the march.  
At City Hall, the outspoken Oretha Castle declared that: “as long as we are held in economic and 
political slavery, they [the whites] aren‟t free either.‟ She ominously predicted that there would be no 
peace „as long as Negroes are forced to live as we are now.‟”130  Even though a few of the demands 
were met, the hiring of African Americans by City Hall would not take place in any great numbers 
until the racial liberal mayor Maurice “Moon” Landrieu came into power on the wave of African 
American votes in 1969.131 
Despite the limited successes of the Dryades Boycott and Freedom March, jobs were 
exceedingly hard to come by for low-income African Americans, even in a time of expanding federal 
intervention in urban communities.  In 1964, approximately three-quarters of all African American 
families earned at or below poverty level wages, and almost half were actually below the poverty 
line.132  In response to deepening poverty and urban uprising, President Lyndon Johnson‟s 
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administration—after considerable pressure from civil rights leaders and racial liberals—embarked 
on the War on Poverty (WOP).  Though civil rights leaders, including King, consistently pushed job 
guarantees, the WOP offered meager funds for job training and economic opportunity.133 One of 
the main job programs was the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), which in theory would 
train low-skill workers and then place them in the private sector for on-the-job training.134  In 
practice, the program did not live up to expectations.  Within the first year, Central City officials 
predicted 250 job placements.  When only 44 jobs materialized in the first six months, Central City 
residents became enraged and a vast majority dropped out of the program.  Federal and local 
officials neglected to realize that “the vast majority of local CEP enrollees were African American, 
yet most jobs in New Orleans beyond low-skill, labor-intensive positions were closed to African 
Americans.”135  Therefore the jobs available to African Americans in New Orleans continued to be 
the ones that they were already able to get. By creating untenable programs with no enforcement, 
the WOP “kept the welfare state fragmented and decentralized.”136 With a fragmented federal 
response to deeply engrained structural employment barriers, the white business elite in New 
Orleans maintained the color line in business with little challenge from the government.    
 Concentrated African American unemployment during the 1950s—coinciding with port 
containerization and economic restructuring—deeply affected household wealth in Central City.137  
Likewise, the movement of the remaining middle-class African American families out of the 
neighborhood drained both stable families and leadership.  By the 1970s, in the words of Clarence 
Barney, the executive director of the Urban League of Greater New Orleans, “Central City [was] the 
largest blighted area in New Orleans” and Dryades was “one of the most terrible areas.”138  Central 
City was becoming characterized by the following report by the Times Picayune entitled “The 
Central City Dilemma:” 
Just as the rubble has increased so have your chances of becoming a murder 
statistic.  There is really no certainty that upon turning down the next side street 
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you will not be mugged or shot by someone disgusted about a rat-infested house, 
the loss of a job, the lack of money or just strung out on drugs.139  
With more than a decade of War on Poverty relief programs, Central City was still in a state of 
decline that seemed insuperable.   Clarence Barney concluded that “all the anti-poverty programs did 
was provide money but left no economic institutions controlled by the people which could become 
self-supporting once the money was turned off.” 140  This kept the residents in a state of poverty, but 
with additional dependencies on federal funds that would soon dwindle. 
 Even though the Dryades Boycott secured a few sales clerk jobs and perhaps a few lower 
level management positions, Dryades Street fell along with the neighborhood as a whole.  As shown 
in Figure 3b, the business activity on Dryades peaked in 1952-1953, but sank by 1958, and then 
dwindled over the several decades until the final plummet in the 1990s.  According to Campanella 
(2006), the Dryades Boycott signaled to Jewish business owners that times were changing.  They 
subsequently moved to other Uptown and suburban neighborhoods.  Jewish merchant Lestor 
Gerson remarked that “People didn‟t want to come [to Dryades] because they didn‟t want to shop 
here under that tension.  They‟d ring up and ask if it were safe to shop.  After awhile they went to 
shopping centers in other parts of the city.”141 Canal Street‟s integration and increased options for 
suburban shopping in the late 1960s facilitated the abandonment of Dryades, which “led to the 
virtual extinction of black business districts” in the city.142   
 Although promises of private sector job creation washed away, the WOP achieved some of 
its goals in New Orleans.  The program created some of the longest surviving service delivery 
systems for low-income African Americans and also became one of the main vehicles for enhancing 
the political power and civic participation of the African American community during the late 1960s.  
In particular, the Central City Economic Opportunity Corporation (CCEOC) acted as a hub for 
“self-help” activities and the funneling of federal funds to local political organizations under the 
Community Action Program, which ultimately produced “several prominent black politicians”143 and 
also led the fight for the commemoration of civil rights leaders and revitalization activities in Central 
City.  
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Figure 3b.  Business Activity on Dryades Street, reproduced with permission from Campanella (2006, p. 275) 
   
Reclaiming the Streets in the 1970s-80s 
Though Central City was in a state of steady decline, there were committed activists still 
pursuing ways to find a way to raise the neighborhood from the depths of poverty, unemployment, 
and disinvestment.  War on Poverty funds quickly dwindled in the 1970s under the Nixon 
Administration, but some of the organizations still survived in Central City.  The CCEOC was one 
in particular that continued working in Central City pursuing street improvements and other ways of 
keeping the neighborhood afloat.  The CCEOC—organized around elected block leaders 
representing all of Central City residents—developed African American leaders that later became 
legislators and city council members.   Along with the political redistricting in the late 1970s that 
allowed for the first African American to sit on the New Orleans City Council since Reconstruction, 
political leaders in Central City commemorated their civil rights history in a neighborhood that had a 
long history of struggle against segregation.  By seizing political control through the War on Poverty 
programs and voting drives, the African American community overcame steep opposition to 
commemorating the past.144 
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In the early 1970s, the CCEOC and residents pushed the City of New Orleans to invest in 
Central City‟s streets.  One such street to be highlighted was the prominent residential street of 
Melpomene that ran through the entire Central City neighborhood, tied together two public housing 
developments, and crossed the historic Dryades Street.  On February 5, 1973, a Melpomene Avenue 
Improvement (MIA) Meeting between the CCEOC and several city staffers finalized a commitment 
from the New Orleans Department of Streets for $150,000 in street repairs.  These city funds would 
be matched with $300,000 in federal funds to perform street repairs from Dryades to S. Claiborne 
Ave.  In addition, the federal funds could be used for a memorial “in the form of a statue or bust” 
that would be placed on a two-block area along Melpomene‟s median filled with flowers, benches, 
trees and shrubs.  At this same meeting, “it was suggested that Melpomene Ave. be renamed in 
memorial of some black leader, someone national or local.”145  Those present suggested either 
Martin Luther King or Mahalia Jackson, a famous gospel singer and civil rights leader from New 
Orleans.  The CCEOC members at the MIA presented this to the full CCEOC board on April 13, 
1973.  The board passed a resolution to rename Melpomene as Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard 
and to designate the neutral ground146 from Dryades to Simon Bolivar as “Freedom Walk.”
147
  
Although the CCEOC sent the resolution to city hall, it did not succeed in changing the name of the 
street under an all-white city council.
148
   According to the Times-Picayune in 1975, the effort was in 
the hands of CCEOC leader and future councilmember James Singleton, who, as director of the 
Central City Neighborhood Council, pushed the renaming of Melpomene Ave to Martin Luther 
King Drive along with the placement of a bronze statue at the end of it.  According to Singleton, it 
was part of a larger planning proposal to revitalize Central City.149   
Although African American leaders gained greater access to politics in New Orleans during 
the administration of Moon Landrieu in the early 1970s, the New Orleans City Council remained all-
white until 1975.  After a highly controversial redistricting plan intended to drain political power 
away from majority African American neighborhoods, a vacant seat in the city council was filled by 
A. L. Davis at the discretion of 6 white council members—a token to the African American 
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community.150  Even so, interest group struggles maintained inequalities for African Americans in 
the fragmented post-Jim Crow pluralist political process.151  
Early in his tenure, Davis proposed a citywide holiday honoring Dr. King.  In the resolution, 
Davis wrote that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.‟s “enormous influence was always directed toward the 
social betterment of minorities and the poor, toward breaking down the artificial barriers that 
separate the races, and toward gaining universal recognition and acceptance of the dignity of all men 
and women, regardless of race, color, creed, class or economic status.”152  The resolution fell flat 
when Davis and other advocates suggested replacing All Saints Day—a difficult proposition in a 
Catholic city—as a holiday for King. 
Davis, undeterred, then took up the initiative to change Melpomene Ave to Martin Luther 
King, Jr. Boulevard.153  At the urging of the City Council Research Staff (CRS), the CRS performed a 
survey of businesses and residents along Melpomene and government officials prior to the 
renaming.  Foreshadowing the business concern surveys in subsequent battles over MLKs across the 
country, the CRS collected information from the Streets Department, the Post Office, business 
owners, the Planning Commission, and neighborhood residents.
154
  On February 5, 1976, the CRS 
sent an Inter-Office Memorandum directly to Councilman A.L. Davis to inform him that the street 
renaming would not be too costly or create problems for the Post Office, that only one business out 
of a random sample of 8 would be financially burdened by the name change, and that numerous 
residents called in support of the renaming.  The memorandum also directly confronts a growing 
preservationist opposition by noting other street name changes in New Orleans.
155
  After the CRS 
analyzed the effects, the City Planning Commission studied the proposal, finding that 900 addresses 
(both commercial and residential) would be affected.  Perhaps avoiding controversy, “The City 
Planning Commission passed on the staff‟s informational report to the council without a 
recommendation as to whether the name should be changed.”156   
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By the end of 1976, Davis successfully shepherded the renaming of Melpomene (between 
Earhart and Baronne) through the city council.   On November 8, 1976 the city council voted in 
favor of the renaming by a 5-1 margin over the lone opposition of an openly racist Joseph 
DiRosa.157  A dryly written and short front-page article in The Times-Picayune noted that the street 
“traverses a heavily black Central City neighborhood.”158  The African American newspaper, The 
Louisiana Weekly, also noted that the street is in a “predominantly black section of town”, but 
remarked that “The street will keep its present name from Carondelet to the River, a more heavily 
white-populated area.”159  Accommodating historic preservationists, Davis negotiated with them and 
Lower Garden District residents to stop MLK before it crossed St. Charles.160   It is most likely that 
Davis and other street renaming advocates thought it would be virtually impossible at the time to 
build political support for a boulevard named after Dr. King that would stretch into a predominantly 
white neighborhood. This was confirmed in interviews with a long-time Central City leader who felt 
that white opposition would have been too intense for the ordinance to pass a nearly all-white 
council.  These political structures limited the commemoration of Dr. King to the segregated 
neighborhood of Central City.161   
The reactions to the name change from several white community members ranged from 
anti-communistic to hostile preservationist to paternalistic—all imbued with racism typical of the 
time.  The League For Less Government Inc. complained of Martin Luther King‟s ties to 
communism and warned: “If we call ourselves Christians and patriotic Americans, we have little 
choice but to oppose our City Council on this action.”
162
  In a letter addressed to the “Members of 
the City Council (Except Joe DiRosa),” a Miss Blackmore wrote:  
I am a 25 year old woman, a registered voter and my degree is in 
 HISTORY.  I  can‟t believe you voted to change Melpomene to Martin 
 Luther King Street.  I don‟t care what the name was, it was just 
 STUPID to mess up the street names of the Muses.  It is interesting 
 that the Muse Melpomene stands for TRAGEDY because it  was tragic 
 what happened!!!!!!!!!!163 
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Typical of a paternalistic valuation of African American culture, a local attorney remarked, 
“don‟t you think that the Blacks in this city would gain a lot of credit if they made a determined effort 
to see that Martin Luther King Avenue becomes one of the best-kept streets in the City of New 
Orleans.”
164
  A “Concerned Orleanian” wrote that Davis‟ “real concern and objective should be 
directed against the so called „black youths‟ who continually roam the streets…in order to prey, 
maim, and steal…. [Davis‟] real civic duty is to point out to your race the true respect for discipline, 
law and order, rather than lending a hand to destroy the culture that Orleanians inherited from a 
past generation.”
165
  Rather than recognizing the commemorative street as an opportunity to inspire 
African Americans and energize efforts to revitalize the neighborhood, white opponents negatively 
branded Dr. King and the boulevard.  This “branding” of MLKs tends to “associate a particular, 
racially coded imagery characterized by economic disadvantage and urban decay” with the 
commemorative streets.166  In the case of Central City, white opponents attempted to devalue and 
derail the commemoration of Dr. King and civil rights struggles.  They failed in that effort, but they 
successfully segregated the commemoration to Central City.  
Electoral politics in Central City became increasingly contentious after Davis broke the City 
Council‟s color line.  In the campaign for the Council seat in 1977, Davis fended off several 
challengers who claimed that his health was failing, that he was unavailable to the public, and that he 
“is not aggressive in trying to deal with problems of the district.”
167
  One of the challengers, James 
Singleton, focused his campaign on housing rehabilitation and “job standards of the service industry 
so those workers can be paid better salaries.”
168
  In response, Davis said one of his “chief 
accomplishments was getting a section of Melpomene Street renamed Martin Luther King Jr. 
Boulevard” and that “he has seen to it that „some of the streets of the district‟ have been upgraded.  
He said he has also worked to bring conventions to the city to stimulate the economy.”
169
  Davis 
won the reelection, but his health dwindled and he passed away in 1978.  Davis‟ legacy was cut short 
and “When he died, a lot of things that he had planned just died with him,” including the effort to 
fully develop the “Freedom Walk” along MLK, according to a long-time Central City leader. 
The political dimensions of commemoration also erupted at that time.  Community leaders, 
city officials, and the CCEOC conducted meetings in the early 1970s to fund a sculpture to be 
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placed at the intersection of Melpomene and Dryades, which was funded by an Economic 
Development Authority grant.170  An African American professor and artist named Frank Hayden 
designed an abstract sculpture of hands intermingling in a display of racial harmony.  The city 
unveiled the sculpture and the “Martin Luther King Walkway” along Melpomene Avenue a few 
months before the city council passed the name change.  When it was unveiled in August of 1976, 
the sculpture immediately became the subject of much heated conversation about the proper way to 
commemorate Dr. King.  At a ceremony with speeches from A.L. Davis, James Singleton, and 
Mayor Moon Landrieu, among others, the responses to the sculpture stole the show.  One “vocal” 
resident felt that “we as a people have been abstracted all our lives, it‟s time for us to be reflected 
realistically.  It looks like a Martian who invaded the ghetto.”171  By December of 1976, the CCEOC 
already appointed a task force to “discuss the current dissatisfaction shared generally by the 
community over what the monument represents.”172  As seen throughout the country, 
commemorating historical figures is a highly political act and is “limited by competition and conflict 
among parties of social actors wishing to narrate the past differently.”173 
The derision of the abstract sculpture continued for years, until a bust of Dr. King was 
erected at S. Claiborne and MLK in 1981.
174
  The debate over the sculpture demonstrated that the 
early commemorative initiatives did not effectively organize at the grassroots level with residents, 
often relying on the political muster of ministers and politicians.175  Political leaders, like A.L. Davis, 
moved the efforts along, in conjunction with organizations like the CCEOC, and came into direct 
confrontation with residents who wanted another kind of recognition for Dr. King and the Civil 
Rights Movement.176   
The bust of King catalyzed more widespread acceptance of civil rights commemoration and 
conversation about the connection between commemoration and revitalization (both sculptures are 
shown in Appendix C).  In a showing of enthusiasm for the bust, Central City residents contributed 
the $29,000 to pay for it. Thousands of people attended the unveiling on Dr. King‟s birthday, which 
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was considered to be the largest MLK Day event in New Orleans at that time.  At the ceremony, 
Mayor Dutch Morial urged the crowd to “establish a new agenda for the decade of the 80s.  Let us 
talk about the issues of improved housing, better education, and sincere peace and harmony for all 
of us that are this nation.  Let us take care of our children and address the elements of racism and 
divisiveness.”177 
 Central City‟s troubles deepened in the 1980s when the economy tanked and drugs and 
violence rampantly swept through the neighborhood, further alienating the community from 
resources and investment.178  This was also a time when Central City purged residents, losing a 
significant share of its population.179  As in African American communities throughout the nation, 
“Segregation concentrated the deprivation created during the 1970s and 1980s to yield intense levels 
of social and economic isolation.”180  Moreover, between 1980 and 2000, New Orleans changed 
from merely a segregated city to being considered hypersegregated, with African American 
populations more concentrated, clustered, and isolated than ever before.181  In this context, Central 
City leaders mounted another civil rights commemorative campaign to reenergize the revitalization 
of Dryades Street, MLK Boulevard, and Central City as a whole.   
In 1989, James Singleton, who was then the councilman from District B in Central City, co-
sponsored two street name changes.  Singleton “became interested in applying King‟s name to the 
remaining portion of Melpomene because of complaints that Martin Luther King Boulevard ends at 
a white neighborhood.”182  Originally the ordinance proposed extending MLK all the way to the 
Mississippi River through a predominantly affluent white community in Coliseum Square.  This 
proposal again drew fierce resistance from white residents, the Coliseum Square Association, and 
historic preservationists.  According to the president of the Coliseum Square Association, “We have 
no problems with Dr. King….it‟s just that he wasn‟t a Greek Muse.”183  One woman wrote that: “A 
compromise was reached in 1977 that would rename only that portion of Melpomene above 
Baronne Street.  For certain members of the City Council to come back twelve years later and try to 
renege on this arrangement seems to me to be grossly unfair to the property owners and residents 
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who live in the Coliseum Square area.”184  After petitions, letters, and significant public pressure, 
Singleton acquiesced and amended the ordinance to rename MLK between Baronne and St. 
Charles—a mere two blocks.185  According to Singleton, “„The Muses mean very little to me 
personally, but I can see it makes a lot of sense to keep the name, the way the streets were done‟, 
with all nine together.”  The city council voted 6-0 in favor of extending MLK to St. Charles on 
April 20, 1989.186  The promotion of King‟s legacy as one that attempts to bridge the segregated 
residential divide was not enough to overcome staunch white cultural resistance—even that which 
was allegedly race neutral.   
Nationally, it is common for African American leaders to attempt to bridge distinct racial 
communities, and equally likely that white opposition “scales” the extent of commemoration to 
segregated communities.187 “When commemorating King, African Americans are often concerned 
about the location of the named street in relation to the white community and the extent to which 
the street serves as a geographic bridge between races.  Accompanying the importance of naming a 
long and prominent thoroughfare is the equally important desire to name a street that reaches 
beyond the confines of the black community.”188 As in the case of the MLK in Central City, 
commemorative streets often fail to transcend these racial boundaries. One community leader felt 
that white opposition was because of Dr. King “being who he was and they just did not want that 
because he was a Black man and they wanted Melpomene to stay there because that depicted white.  
So they said this is alright, this is all black so you can leave it there.”  Though many MLKs connect 
different racially defined communities, they more often than not stop at the literal or figurative 
tracks, such as the MLK in New Orleans, which abruptly stops at the Uptown St. Charles street car 
line (Figure 3c).   The abrupt end to MLK and the “suffering associated with King Boulevard in 
New Orleans prompts us to consider how the Civil Rights Movement, both in terms of how it 
changed society and how it is remembered, is a project that is far from being complete.”189 
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Figure 3c. Martin Luther King Jr. and Melpomene join at St. Charles streetcar line (Author‟s photo) 
 
Although less vehement than the open white racism in 1976, the proposed extension of 
MLK brought vocal opposition from the white business community affected by the proposed name 
change.  The president of Mardi Gras Masquerade, Inc. (MGM)—a costume rental company located 
on Melpomene—wrote in opposition to the name change, claiming, “I hope you realize the 
hardships that a street change would place on MGM Costume rentals….If we lose these years of 
establishment and identification with a New Orleans Art neighborhood…I must seriously consider a 
move out of New Orleans.”190   In addition, several business owners, including MGM, claimed that 
the business expense of changing stationery would force the closure of the business.191  Although no 
national survey has been done to show the impact of address changes, anecdotal evidence found it 
to be negligible.192 As seen in renaming debates around the country, “commercial interests are 
consistently the most vocal opponents to having their address change, citing not only the cost and 
inconvenience but also the potential stigma of having their street identified with King and, as they 
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perceive it, the African American community.”193 As in this case, the outspoken business opposition 
to MLK renaming can sometimes have “material effects”, which “influence[s] consumer behavior, 
investment decisions.”194  In New Orleans, as in other cities, the branding of civil rights 
commemorative boulevards resembles redlining—directly influencing investment decisions—and 
also the threat of blockbusting, where white business owners flee in the face of a name change, 
leaving vacant buildings in their wake.195     
On the same day in April of 1989, 11 blocks of Dryades—encompassing the historic 
commercial corridor—became Oretha Castle Haley196 Boulevard.  Similar to the desire in the African 
American community to extend MLK, some leaders wished the renaming of Dryades to extend 
further “all the way to Louisiana Avenue…because it‟s still a black area.” Council member Dorothy 
Mae Taylor introduced the ordinance to honor Haley—one of her long-time friends who passed 
away in 1987.  Taylor was quoted as saying that Haley, “brought hope to a dying city, brought hope 
to people who felt they were nobodies.”197  The only opponent on the city council was Peggy Wilson 
who criticized the way the name change was introduced and that she had deep memories of 
shopping on Dryades in her childhood.  One leader in Central City later exclaimed that O.C. Haley 
was an “African American Street,”198 proclaiming that the street ultimately was now in the hands of 
the African American community.  Although these competing memories affected the renaming 
debate, they did not seem to influence the momentum towards revitalizing the area.  Both the 
“proponents and opponents agreed that to make the new name meaningful, the city will have to 
seek ways to upgrade the new Haley Boulevard, a long-time shopping district that has become badly 
deteriorated.”199  There are, however, continuing tensions between the historic preservationists and 
Central City African Americans over how to redevelop properties in the neighborhood, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
 One of the common political outcomes arising from controversial street renaming debates is 
the use of a street renaming ordinance, which determines a precise methodology for renaming a 
street. During the debate over renaming O.C. Haley, Councilmember Wilson was quoted as saying 
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that “such changes should be made only „according to established procedures.‟”200 In New Orleans, 
there was clearly enough controversy over the renaming of streets, schools, and parks in the 1980s-
90s to create a street renaming ordinance in November of 1994.201  The history of New Orleans, 
even street names, is a highly contentious and influential part of city‟s “romance, tradition and 
mystique,” which is why preservationists formed a unified front against the name change.202 In many 
ways, the heated debate over commemorating public space is a necessary element of democratic 
participation and that: 
To some extent at least, community opposition toward any naming gesture ought to be 
taken into account. Imposing a name on a particular geographic community forces people to 
honor and remember an individual that a majority of the affected political subdivision may 
not view favorably. One might counter, however, that this is exactly the segment of the 
public that could significantly benefit from exposure to certain kinds of values and diversity 
through the selective naming of mainstream public facilities. Naming gestures could have a 
normalizing effect on names that were previously controversial or polarizing, paving the way 
for enhanced consideration, if not acceptance, of the views or values that these names 
represent, after opposition subsided.203 
It is unclear, however, that street renaming ordinances solve the problem of how to develop 
equitable political decision-making processes for historically marginalized people.  Ordinances often 
require signatures or petitions from residents and so “at the heart of the ordinance issue is the 
question of boundaries and who has a stake in the decision-making politics of street renaming.”204 
  
Conclusion 
  The Civil Rights Movement in New Orleans began in the Central City neighborhood, as well 
as the commemoration of these struggles in the form of street renaming and public art.  The 
movement to rename streets after Dr. King and Oretha Castle Haley arose from African American 
political power struggles and organizing that came out of the War on Poverty programs of the 
1960s.  This newfound power allowed for the negotiation of civil rights commemoration in highly 
contested arenas to literally change the physical and historical power that whites had over the 
landscape.205  It did not, however, overcome the white political structures that affected the location 
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and scale of the street renaming.  The persistent stigmatization of Martin Luther King Jr. himself 
and the African American community in general, as well as conflicts over preserving the “history” of 
New Orleans, perpetuated the segregation of African American heritage to Central City.   
Unfortunately, the effects of dividing the street and political landscape had consequences that 
renaming could not overcome, with large macro social forces such as structural racism, segregation, 
and disinvestment affecting Central City from the outside as well as within. 
 Commemoration and politics are intimately intertwined.  Central City leaders used civil 
rights commemoration as a way to challenge white controlled institutions and representation of 
history.206  Additionally, community leaders and residents debated the meaning and usefulness of 
commemoration within the confines of segregation.  Despite its limitations, civil rights 
commemoration can be instrumental in challenging segregation, structural racism, and the denial of 
resources to African American communities.  As such, the selection and repetitive use of 
appropriate civil rights narratives are important for framing the political struggles for equality.  It is 
most advantageous to use commemoration at politically strategic times to affect change for 
segregated African American communities.    
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Although much has been made of the failure of a half-century‟s 
efforts to revitalize the inner city, very little has been made of the 
failure to acknowledge how continued racism has defeated these 
revitalization efforts.207 
 
4 
The Long Struggle for a Revitalized Central City 
 
 Revitalization efforts in Central City started more than forty years ago and persist through 
each turbulent decade.  Through the years, “Central City has been a target area for every style of 
planning that has happened.”208  An immense amount of planning, funding, and community energy 
went into the few successful and many unsuccessful anchor developments in the neighborhood.  
Community-based organizations and dedicated individuals sustained the revitalization efforts with 
their unceasing and evolving vision of a Central City renaissance, tying the civil rights history and 
vibrant culture of the neighborhood to a growing awareness for culture-based heritage tourism.209  
As a new growth industry, heritage tourism offers a potential avenue for economic development and 
investment in Central City, especially in a city with a strong tourism economy.  However, as this tool 
for economic development spreads around the country, specifically within African American 
communities in the South, competition among neighborhoods and between cities limit the tool‟s 
impacts for Central City. 210   Moreover, the question remains whether an African American tourism 
economy can integrate fully with the larger economy and bring an end to structural racism.  
 The glacial pace of revitalization often provokes criticism of neighborhood reinvestment 
initiatives.  These criticisms, however, often ignore the structural impediments to revitalizing a 
blighted and disinvested African American community.211  As shown in the previous chapters, 
structural racism created segregated neighborhoods and economies and exaggerated resource and 
power inequities.  In the context of Central City‟s revitalization, fragmented public policy and 
planning, budget cuts, and continued economic segregation maintain historical inequities and 
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structures for African Americans.212  This fragmentation created funding discrepancies and 
investment constraints, impeding the ability for Central City to develop the massive resources 
necessary to reach a “turning point” towards reinvestment and economic integration.213  Moreover, 
mainstream neighborhood revitalization strategies do not sufficiently address the long struggle in 
African American communities to overcome structural racism.214  A new revitalization and planning 
movement—one cognizant of structural impediments to redevelopment, imbued with living history, 
and armed with a strategy and vision for realizing a turning point—offers the potential to be a 
“change strategy” in overcoming historical inequities.215  It is precisely at the intersection of history, 
culture, structural racism, and planning for revitalization that we find civil rights commemorative 
streets poised for such an analysis.  
 This chapter begins with a brief overview of some early revitalization efforts that laid the 
foundation for more recent developments in Central City.  Then, I review several of the most 
important plans for Central City produced over the last two decades, showing the consistency of 
language for revitalization around heritage tourism and the limitations of the planning process.  
Finally, I review several anchor projects along Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard and MLK and the 
structural impediments preventing the full articulation of Central City‟s “turning point.”  
 
Early Revitalization Efforts  
 The Model Cities and Urban Renewal programs—both authorized in Louisiana in 1968—
offered a renewed direction towards housing, infrastructure, and economic development in Central 
City.  Numerous studies, plans, and promises were made in the early 1970s as the City of New 
Orleans geared up for investing federal funds in distressed neighborhoods throughout the city.   
Though some of the funds went to the housing and infrastructure improvements, the vast majority 
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of federal funds went to downtown and riverfront development.  Ultimately, the city‟s investment of 
federal funds in major economic development and tourism—such as the Superdome and the 1984 
World‟s Fair—bypassed an opportunity to address structural change for target neighborhoods.  
Furthermore, rather than provide a singular vision for the redevelopment of New Orleans‟ blighted 
neighborhoods, the city‟s fragmented approach to economic development and metropolitan 
governance stalled early revitalization efforts.216   
 The most telling evidence of the City of New Orleans‟ housing priorities under the Model 
Cities Program is shown in letters between Central City housing developers and Mayor Moon 
Landrieu‟s office in the early 1970s.  The Central City Housing Development Corporation 
(CCHDC) showed frustration with the pace of housing investment and the lack of focus on lower-
income housing solutions.  In the CCHDC‟s perspective, “It appears that the [housing] policy is to 
assist „Private Industry‟ rather than „private owner occupants and individuals.‟”217  In another letter, 
the CCHDC claimed “it was geared up to build houses with a ready market of approved buyers 
when a moratorium was placed on subsidized housing in January 1973.  Prior to that it was put in a 
holding position by Model Cities and told to do nothing but exist.”218  The Nixon administration‟s 
moratorium on federally subsidized housing in 1973 began the process of federal retrenchment in 
housing policy and directly impacted federally dependent and limited capacity organizations like the 
CCHDC.   In an “era of fiscal austerity and declining urban resources…the political isolation of 
blacks makes them extremely vulnerable to cutbacks in governmental services and public 
investments.”219 
 Only one major housing development—Satchmo Plaza, which took 7 years to develop 34 
units220—opened between the 1960s and the late 1990s in Central City.221  As shown as early as the 
1950s, “despite increasing Negro political power, income and rising standards of expectation 
affecting housing, the market forces at work in New Orleans still seem to be incapable of supplying 
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sufficient good housing to this part of the community.”222  The private and public housing 
development constraints persisted for decades as the neighborhood continued to lose its population 
and the aging neighborhood became increasingly blighted.  The combination of Central City‟s 
isolation from private investment, fragmented public policy and planning, and dwindling public 
funding sources created a toxic environment for housing development.   
 Some improvements along Dryades Street materialized in the 1970s.  In an effort to keep 
business attractive along Dryades, which already significantly declined, a partnership between the 
City of New Orleans, CCEOC, Community Improvement Agency, and the Dryades Street 
Businessman‟s Association invested funds in streetscaping in 1975-1976 (Figure 4a).  Even with 
partnerships between public and private organizations, there was apparently not enough funds 
allocated for maintenance, and within a few years the plants were dying and newly installed benches 
were “becoming unusable.”223  One long-time businessman along Dryades lamented the state of the 
street and warned that only certain private investment strategies would renew what he called “Little 
Canal.”  Asked whether there was a chance for Dryades to be revitalized, he said, “Yes, the potential 
is still here.  But we have to get some of the national chain stores to locate here.  Like Shoe Town, 
Sears, or K-Mart.  They would have the prestige to bring people back to Dryades.  A large store 
would have the impact on customers.  It‟s the only salvation.  The small merchant will never 
improve Dryades Street again.”224 This haunting perspective forewarns of the powerful structural 
impediments inhibiting African American small business revitalization along O.C. Haley.  
                
Figure 4a. Dryades Street Improvement Project, 1975-1976.  A.L Davis is 2nd from right and James Singleton 
is 5th from right.  New Orleans Public Library City Archives 
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 One plan in the mid-1970s called the Heritage Square Planning Project (HSPP) attempted to 
create cultural, commercial, and housing opportunities for Central City.  Sponsored by the Urban 
League of New Orleans, CCEOC, and city and federal officials, the HSPP targeted a large Central 
City parcel on Dryades Street for heritage tourism and mixed-use development.  “The major 
objective of the project is to develop a process for revitalizing the Central City Community….It 
could provide a focus, a rallying point for a new sense of awareness and pride in the moment of the 
black experience in our nation‟s development.”225  Even though citizen participation in the project 
identified a widespread desire for “broad-based community ownership of the ventures that are 
developed,”226 the heritage aspect of the plan focused on developing a “mall or strip incorporating 
commercial and entertainment facilities which are oriented toward the history and culture of Black 
Americans.”227  The plan does not make it clear how history or culture would influence development 
in a commercial mall or strip; rather, the plan seemed to commodify the African American 
experience just like in many other heritage tourism developments.228  Despite publicly funded plans 
and market analyses—Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) funded the project as late as 
1980229—the project required considerable private sector investment.  Although it is unclear the 
exact reasons for HSPP‟s failure, it is likely that private lending institutions failed to invest in the 
African American businesses along a significantly disinvested corridor.230  This project would have 
been the first heritage tourism anchor on the historic Dryades Street, and it offers historical context 
to future plans for a cultural arts corridor.   
 Even though public funding for economic development in 1970s-80s prioritized massive 
downtown projects, Central City successfully built some heritage tourism infrastructure (as shown in 
Chapter 3).  Within the context of a growing effort to revitalize O.C. Haley and MLK in the 80s and 
90s, a fledgling African American heritage tourism business ventured into Central City.  Called 
“Roots of New Orleans,” a daily tour started in 1993 that took tourists around the city to show 
“how African Americans have worked and played and contributed in New Orleans since the time of 
slavery.”  One part of the tour led visitors “through the heart of black New Orleans”—down 
Claiborne, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard—and mentioned the 
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importance of civil rights activities and landmarks in the city, such as the Dryades YMCA and the 
formation of the SCLC in Central City.  The tour essentially charted the existing heritage 
infrastructure of the “Freedom Walk” designed along MLK and arriving at historic O.C. Haley.   
According to one participant on the tour:  
„There are parts of the city that people really don‟t get to see.  This is like the real life New 
Orleans….Most (white) people know that they (black people) were slaves and in cotton 
fields.  That‟s all of what most people know.‟231  
Despite the creation of this particular tour in the early 1990s, the general New Orleans tourism 
business, with few exceptions, rarely acknowledged important landmarks of the African American 
experience.  The reasons most cited for this were personal safety and the fact that “black heritage 
sites have either been destroyed, neglected, or undeveloped by the city.”232  Even though Central 
City played a pivotal role in the local and national campaign for civil rights, the derelict buildings, 
reported high crime rates, and poverty affected its potential as a business corridor and heritage 
tourism site.  To reverse this trend, community organizations and political leaders envisioned a Black 
Cultural Tourism District along O.C. Haley.  This vision continues to unfold with each successive 
plan for O.C. Haley and Central City.  
 
The Plan Goes On… 
 Civil rights commemoration directly influenced planning efforts in Central City as far back as 
the 1970s, but the pace quickened during the 1990s following the renaming of Dryades to O.C. 
Haley Boulevard. Community organizations fused commemoration with a dynamic cultural 
renaissance of O.C. Haley and Central City, changing the focus of commemoration from a static 
recording of past events to a celebration of the intertwining of living culture, commerce, and history.  
These organizations, and many leaders and residents in the community, participated in plan after 
plan for the neighborhood and the O.C. Haley and MLK corridors.   Throughout, plans for the 
boulevard developed a consistent language and vision for the revitalization, which kept the 
momentum for reinvestment alive, but also raises questions about who is carrying the torch of 
revitalization—residents or community-based organizations—and whom will redevelopment benefit 
in Central City.  Moreover, the fragmented planning process in New Orleans over the last few 
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decades demonstrates that traditional planning models are likely inappropriate to deal with structural 
racism, segregation, and historical inequalities for African American inner city communities.233   
 
    O.C. Haley Black Cultural Tourism District (’95) and Redevelopment: An Opportunity for Renewal (’97) 
 Leaders in Central City created the first culture-based redevelopment plan for O.C. Haley in 
1995.  Motivated “out of concern for the economic survival of the Black race” and worried that only 
2% of New Orleans‟ businesses were owned by African Americans, the CCEOC led the effort to 
create the O.C. Haley Black Cultural Tourism District (the District).234   The District—a 
collaborative effort between the CCEOC, city officials, business organizations, and African 
American-owned banks—envisioned the boulevard‟s revitalization as a series of African American 
owned and operated anchor projects with a “cultural-based theme” that would spark further 
redevelopment. 235 “The District will highlight and profile Black culture by providing „Living History‟ 
to locals and visitors alike who enjoy music, food, and theatrical performances.”   The purpose of 
this model would be to create a “vertically-integrated tourism district” that would be a model for 
“Black youth” on how African Americans can own, operate, and celebrate their own enterprising 
culture.   A major anchor of the boulevard would be the Black Cultural and Educational Center to 
“revitalize and highlight the traditional history of jazz, and other Black culture in the District.”236   
 Over the course of a few years, the District plan turned into more concrete proposals in the 
O.C. Haley Boulevard Redevelopment: An Opportunity for Renewal study (Redevelopment Study).  The 
Redevelopment Study gave further clarity to the anchor projects (but made no mention of the Black 
Cultural and Educational Center) and gave details on the financing and expected leasing for the 
developments.237  The Central City Councilmember at the time, Oliver Thomas, “expresse[d] the 
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hope for more private investors and more government seed money” as a result of the study.238  Even 
so, the Redevelopment Study identified several weaknesses with the projects, namely that the area is 
“declining” with poor housing stock, that collateral is “weak,” and that there are “risks associated 
with start up businesses.”239 
 The Redevelopment Study identified two main projects to anchor the cultural aspect of the 
plan and spark reinvestment.  One anchor would be a renovated historic Handelman Building, 
containing a street-level restaurant and hotel suites above.  According to the project‟s sponsor, 
CCEOC, the development took more than 10 years to complete—with numerous financial 
challenges along the way because of organizational capacity and lack of tax credit expertise—but it 
now houses several mission-driven non-profits and low- to moderate-income housing units.  A 
companion anchor, called the Venus Gardens, was intended to be a renovated historic building filled 
with commercial space and market-rate loft apartments. 240  Moved along by the financial support of 
a bank, the project got off the ground quickly.  The developers convinced the non-profit, Efforts of 
Grace, to open Ashé Cultural Arts Center, which now owns the apartments above and rents them as 
affordable units to artists.  Both anchor projects from the Redevelopment Study are currently 
occupied, but the plans did not trigger massive reinvestment in restaurant, music, and art 
venues241—even with the financial backing of a bank.  Nor did the developments bring middle-class 
residents that could fill market-rate apartments.  These developments did, however, trigger further 
planning for the boulevard and created the first working document for a cultural arts district.  
 
    1999 Land Use Plan  
 The City of New Orleans‟ 1999 Land Use Plan (the 1999 Plan) for District Two includes 
plans for competing neighborhoods that are often at odds over the redevelopment of O.C. Haley 
and Central City in general.   Tellingly, the 1999 Plan lacks any reference to the previous Black 
Cultural Tourism District plans for O.C. Haley.  Overall, the focus of the 1999 Plan is on public 
housing redevelopment (along MLK in particular), mixed-use revitalization of blighted residential 
and commercial buildings, and a particularly strong focus on historic preservation.  This is not 
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surprising considering the rich architectural history of the district.  Preservation, however, has been a 
very troublesome conversation in Central City, as the goals of white preservationists from more 
affluent parts of the district often take precedence over the needs of the Central City community.   
 The 1999 Plan targeted O.C. Haley Boulevard for mixed-use reinvestment.  There is no 
comprehensive strategy or vision to achieve a fully revitalized boulevard.  Blanket recommendations 
for preservation of existing buildings and mixed-use development give little context or planning 
goals for a neighborhood significantly affected by disinvestment and blight.242  The 1999 Plan 
recognizes some inherent tensions between historic preservation and revitalization, but it does not 
offer recommendations on how to reconcile the significant differences:  
The main issue confronting District Two is one of balancing a dire need for redevelopment 
and revitalization of the distressed neighborhoods while, at the same time, protecting and 
preserving their historic character and architecture. Many local, as well as national examples 
show that goals of economic development and historic preservations could, or should be 
one and the same. However, the success of this “dual” approach relies on the determination 
of all segments of the community to work together and articulate strategies for a successful 
revitalization of the area.243 
More than a decade after the 1999 Plan, with revitalization continuing to move slowly, the 
recommended dual approach did not prove successful.  Boasting of the power of historical 
preservation as a tool for revitalization, the New Orleans Historic District Landmarks Commission 
claimed, “Landmark protection over the past decade has prevented this area from becoming 
completely devastated.”
244
  Although community leaders in Central City strive to protect historic 
buildings, the single biggest impediment to revitalization along O.C. Haley, according to one Central 
City leader, is the dominance of historic preservationists in redevelopment decisions—just as in 
commemoration decisions.245  Another leader emphasized that Central City plans prioritized people 
over real estate, unlike historic preservationists.246  These debates, left open-ended in the 1999 Plan, 
emphasize that traditional land use planning is unfit for “increasing justice and cooperation between 
urban planners and the African American urban community” as well as reconciling differences 
between politically inequitable interest groups.247  Without recognizing the inequities and history of 
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racism between segregated communities, the planning process is unlikely to properly address 
structural racism in the African American inner city.248   
 
    Central City Renaissance Alliance Plan  
 Unsurprisingly, the 1999 Plan did not satisfy residents and community-based organizations 
in Central City.  In collaboration with the department of planning and resource development in the 
New Orleans‟ office of community development, community organizations in Central City obtained 
CDBG and foundation grants for a new planning process that would build capacity for 
neighborhood organizations and create a vision for the entire community.  This process culminated 
in 2004 with the creation of the Central City Renaissance Alliance‟s Community Plan (CCRA Plan) 
conducted by Concordia LLC.  The CCRA Plan focused on ways that “all Central City residents can 
benefit from programs that promote community connectivity, address social issues, celebrate the 
neighborhood‟s culture and heritage, and prioritize the maintenance, development and use of the 
community‟s physical resources.”249  As a whole, the CCRA plan created a dynamic expression of 
history, visions of revitalization, and strategies to overcome impediments to equitable development. 
 The CCRA Plan identifies O.C. Haley as the “community‟s main boulevard” and made clear 
its importance as a cultural heritage district. Noting the contributions and importance of Mardi Gras 
Indians, jazz and blues musicians, and visual and performance artists, the plan calls for this “critical 
mass of cultural activities” to “provide the basis for attracting cultural tourism,” which should be 
“marketed locally, nationally, and internationally.”250 The vision for O.C. Haley also includes 
mention of a Louisiana State Civil Rights Museum as an anchor project and the proposed Louisiana 
“heritage trail.”251 Interestingly, the CCRA plan uses the U-Street district in Washington D.C. as a 
model for a heritage tourism site, but does not mention how that example ultimately led to 
gentrification in the neighborhood252—something that the CCRA plan attempted to mitigate by 
“managing gentrification.” 
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 The CCRA‟s implementation structure, though relying heavily on community-based 
organizations, focused on action committees that could keep both the momentum and resident 
empowerment alive.  As part of the CCRA planning process, an Action Team worked to train 
resident leaders to assist with the implementation.  However, in the appendix of the CCRA plan 
there are numerous complaints—generated from the feedback surveys of the planning process—of 
lack of authentic Central City resident participation.  The CCRA plan was, in many ways, a 
convening of leaders and community organizations.  One community leader felt disheartened about 
the CCRA‟s recent citizen engagement and was dismayed that the CCRA “really lost their way as far 
as I‟m concerned.  They‟re not even bringing in people in their community, much less across St. 
Charles Avenue.”    
 The CCRA plan did, however, exemplify the growing use of community-based planning, 
which grew out of the failure of traditional planning models to address the concerns in African 
American communities.253  These initiatives derive “insights from the struggles of African 
Americans: the battle against Jim Crow, traditions of leadership and organization, residential 
segregation, and dilapidated housing.  Blacks have always linked together the struggle against 
poverty, racial segregation, bad housing, residential segregation, and employment discrimination and 
made them part of the broader fight for freedom, democratic rights, equity, and socioeconomic 
justice.”254  The CCRA plan had flaws, but it did provide a framework for a new way of addressing 
structural issues and a vision for the neighborhood that did not compromise Central City leadership 
values for other surrounding communities.  Even though the CCRA plan laid the foundation for a 
comprehensive Central City renaissance, the plan quickly fragmented in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina, which disrupted the plan before it could become formalized. 
 
    Unified New Orleans Plan 
 Hurricane Katrina brought both devastating floods and a renewed focus and profusion of 
resources for the revitalization of New Orleans‟ distressed neighborhoods.  Central City received 
considerable redevelopment attention, especially with concerted efforts by foundations and 
community-based organizations.255  Central City seemed poised to take advantage of the post-
Katrina infusion of funds for redevelopment.  According to one leader in the community, “We took 
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advantage of the storm, but we were already moving; we were already organized.”  The most 
significant neighborhood-based planning initiative after Katrina, the Unified New Orleans Plan 
(UNOP), delved deeply into a potential future for Central City and promised resources to realize 
it.256 
 Unlike the 1999 Plan, the UNOP makes quite clear the importance and relevance of O.C. 
Haley in the revitalization of Central City.  Trumpeting the redevelopment potential of O.C. Haley, 
the plan calls it “one of the most historically, culturally and artistically significant boulevards in New 
Orleans.”257  The UNOP also positions it in the history of revitalization attempts and how it could 
relate to larger trends for redevelopment in Central City as a whole: 
Having fallen into a cycle of systemic disinvestment far prior to Katrina, the street was 
receiving moderate investment Pre-Katrina. Post-Katrina, a revitalized O.C. Haley Blvd. can 
be the neighborhood-level catalyst for economic development and revival for the Central 
City neighborhood.258  
By recognizing the boulevard‟s historic context in terms of culture as well as redevelopment 
impediments and investment needs, this plan offered new direction to Central City‟s recovery and 
revitalization after Katrina.   
 The UNOP targeted the well-known Civil Rights Museum proposal as a major driver for 
economic development on O.C. Haley.  Recognizing that there was “widespread support” for its 
location on the boulevard, the UNOP identifies the tourist destination as another “spearhead…for 
revitalization of O.C. Haley Blvd., Central City and the District.”259  Clearly doing their research, the 
UNOP expands on the potential for the museum as part of the Central City‟s civil rights history, 
living history and culture.  As such, the museum would “celebrate New Orleans‟ role in the Civil 
Rights Movement, local activists such as Oretha Castle Haley and A.L. Davis and the historic role of 
O.C. Haley Blvd. in the African American Community,” as well as Mardi Gras Indians, musicians, 
and multicultural connections between African Americans and the Jewish community.260   
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 Unfortunately, the UNOP fragmented into a “wish list” of planning initiatives and its 
relatively ineffective implementation posed significant hurdles for concerted redevelopment.261   
Even with the detailed history and vision for the revitalization of O.C. Haley and Central City, the 
UNOP calls for additional planning of “comprehensive market feasibility” and a “comprehensive 
landscape and streetscape plan.”  There is no recognition for the responsible party to develop these 
plans and how they would relate to the recommendations by UNOP.  Despite the overwhelming 
detail of the UNOP neighborhood studies, the overall “failure of local officials to designate a single 
accountable agency to oversee recovery planning hindered the development of a clear, citywide 
rebuilding strategy” and also negatively affected the implementation of plans at the neighborhood 
scale. 262  Further issues around UNOP‟s implementation arose when the City of New Orleans 
embarked on yet another planning process to create an official Master Plan.  With fewer 
neighborhood details but more direct impact on plan implementation, the CCRA made a special 
meeting with the master plan team, Goody Clancy, to ensure that their planning efforts would be 
included.263  However, it is not clear from the Master plan documents where the plan fits in or how 
it is made legal under a master plan with the force of law.   
 Although not directly tied to any planning effort, Central City finally achieved its status as a 
cultural arts corridor in 2008, among many others throughout the state.  Mitch Landrieu, who was 
Louisiana Lieutenant Governor at the time, created the Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard Cultural Arts 
Corridor.264  Rather than require businesses to have a culture-based theme, as the original purpose 
intended, the cultural arts corridor would offer tax benefits just like other overlay districts already on 
O.C. Haley.265  As such, it is unclear how the cultural arts corridor status will affect the ongoing 
revitalization of the boulevard and the search for anchor institutions.  
                                                 
261 Bureau of Governmenal Research, “Not Ready for Prime Time: An Analysis of the UNOP Citywide Plan,” March, 
2007. 
262 Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, 2007, p. 25; also see Bureau of Governmental Research, “Not Ready For Prime 
Time: An Analysis of the UNOP Citywide Plan,” March, 2007.  
263 Interview with community leader 
264 Moran, Kate, “Landrieu unveils cultural districts in New Orleans, Tammany,” The Times Picayune, December 04, 
2008. 
265 O.C. Haley Black Cultural Tourism District, O.C. Haley Investment Corporation‟s Plan for Economic Development, 
Hewitt-Washington & Associates, 1995, New Orleans Public Library City Archives, Mayor Marc Morial, Economic 
Development and Policy Planning Division, Records of the Office of Tourism, Arts and Entertainment, Tourism Files, 
Box 8, O.C. Haley Redevelopment Project folder 
 58  
The Central City Turning Point?: Searching for Anchor Institutions  
 For more than a decade, Central City organizations, residents, and local leaders have 
searched for anchor institutions to hold the renaissance of O.C. Haley and Central City together and 
provide focus on overcoming historic inequities for Central City residents.  Anchors are a common 
place-based strategy used frequently as a tool for stabilizing and revitalizing neighborhoods by 
encouraging development and investment.  Increasingly, anchors are used by community 
organizations to “build communities that are healthy places to live and work.”266  In Central City, the 
celebration of local civil rights history and Central City culture fueled the early search for appropriate 
anchors, as leaders sought institutions that developed place- and people-based solutions.  The 
following discussion of anchors shows both the dynamic and widespread usage of the concept of 
anchors, as well as the structural limitations on each type of anchor that leaders sought to locate 
along O.C. Haley and in Central City, especially those with a people-based mission.  Even armed 
with the dynamic cultural vision for an “African American Street,” Central City still struggles to 
integrate its economy with the larger metropolitan or regional economy, a key factor in ensuring the 
success of the boulevard and the neighborhood.267   
 
    Community-based organizations as the early anchors 
 Unlike the vision for O.C. Haley as a cultural arts tourism district, many of the past and 
present anchor project tenants along the boulevard are community-based organizations with people-
based missions.  The most significant early anchor along O.C. Haley is the Dryades YMCA, first 
built in 1905, which is the longest-running community facility in Central City and a significant 
anchor for the neighborhood.  It served as the hub for many civil rights activities in Central City, 
and was a frequent meeting spot for A.L. Davis and other leaders in the community during the 
1950s-60s.  According to one community leader, the YMCA anchored the end of O.C. Haley at 
Philip Street, while the Louisiana Civil Rights Museum was to anchor the other end near Earhart.  In 
2000, the YMCA tragically burned down and became another focal point for reinvestment along 
O.C. Haley.268  As opposed to so many other obstructed redevelopment projects along the 
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boulevard, the YMCA returned within a few years and continues to anchor one end of O.C. Haley, 
while the other end languishes.  
 In the late 1990s, several organizations opened on O.C. Haley and played a major role in the 
renewed attention to the boulevard‟s potential.  One of them, the Ashé Cultural Arts Center (Ashé), 
opened in 1998 in the Venus Gardens development on O.C. Haley, acting as a community center, 
arts and performance space, and active space for bringing the history and culture of Central City to 
efforts to revitalize the neighborhood.  The director of Ashé, Carol Bebelle, was an early proponent 
of cultural tourism and hoped “Ashé and its neighbors will help jumpstart a movement to turn 
Oretha Castle Haley into a cultural tourism corridor fueling economic development in Central 
City.”269 Operating under the banner of “everything goes better with culture,” Ashé promotes and 
hosts various cultural events along “the Boulevard,” which act as “gatherings” to bring people 
together to dance, sing, and eat while building community (flier examples shown in Appendix D). 
Ashé also collaborated with artists in the neighborhood to bring murals to MLK and O.C. Haley, 
which depict the civil rights struggle and the vitality of Central City (Appendix E). Slowly, these early 
anchors, and several others, helped attract more investment along O.C. Haley and provided a 
framework for redeveloping the boulevard around principles of culture and the African American 
experience.   
 
    Heritage tourism and the Louisiana State Civil Rights Museum  
 The longest-lasting, open-ended search for an anchor institution in Central City is the 
proposed Louisiana State Civil Rights Museum (the Museum).  The process began in 1999 when the 
Louisiana Legislature passed a bill—with one lone dissenting vote—that “established” the museum 
but did not create a board, specify a location or provide funds for the development of the site.  Sen. 
Diana Bajoie sponsored the bill and conjectured that the “most likely site appears to be someplace 
on or near Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard, which is in Bajoie‟s Central City District.” According to 
Bajoie, “the [Civil Rights] Movement started there.”270  From the perspective of leaders and 
foundations, the museum “offers tremendous redevelopment potential and is critical to the 
revitalization of  the boulevard and the neighborhood.”271 
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 Despite the longevity of the campaign for the museum, there are significant factors locally 
and nationally that affect the viability of a heritage tourism anchor.   Even though the Louisiana 
Legislature created a museum board in 2004 with members from Central City organizations, the 
New Orleans School Board approved plans for redeveloping it at the abandoned Myrtle Banks 
School on O.C. Haley, and numerous plans and studies agreed on the placement, the location and 
realization of the Museum is still completely unresolved.272   As late as 2010—11 years after it was 
originally established—the decision to locate the museum in the Myrtle Banks school was threatened 
by the New Orleans School District‟s decision to demolish the building, based on the building‟s 
structural integrity and overwhelming cost of renovation.  Moreover, several neighborhoods now vie 
for the opportunity to claim the museum for their own.  According to Carol Bebelle: 
 “There is an energy moving behind the museum now, and so other places in the city now 
want to be considered….If there‟s anything that could really stain a building with injustice 
would be for this opportunity to happen and for it to be brought to another community.” 
In response to the pressure from other neighborhoods, organizations like Ashé are petitioning to 
keep the location in Central City because it is the “perfect location for this institution dedicated to 
the advocacy for civil rights and social justice, past, present and future.”273  Nonetheless, planning 
for this project is in perpetual purgatory.  Even with recommendations from citywide plans such as 
the UNOP, the future of the Museum‟s location is uncertain.  According to one community leader, 
“Some plans die, some don‟t; you see how long it‟s taking to do the civil rights museum.  This stuff 
does not come easily.” 
 At the national level, African American heritage tourism, in just a little more than a decade, 
spread across the South and is now considered a “growth industry.”274  Just as neighborhoods in 
New Orleans vie for the Museum, so too are cities and communities vying for economic 
development tied to civil rights commemoration.275  The risk in Central City is not only that the 
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Museum will move elsewhere, but also that as a tool for growth the benefits may bypass the already 
disadvantaged as in other growth-oriented development.276 
 
    Lending institutions and the Hope Community Credit Union  
 In 1978, soon after Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), New 
Orleans Mayor Ernest Morial called “redlining a „considerable problem‟ in New Orleans,” but he 
“expressed cautious optimism” that loan programs tied to the CRA would alleviate it.277  By 
requiring savings and loans, or deposit-based banks, to invest in the community where deposits are 
made, the CRA would presumably overcome historic inequities in private lending.  Unfortunately, 
the CRA offered few incentives for banks to locate branches in communities without a financial 
institution.278  Central City lacked a community or private lending institution for several decades and 
this significantly affected residents‟ ability to secure private loans and stabilize the community.279  
Most residents in Central City “found it impossible to obtain a loan from a bank or homestead.”280  
These credit problems were massive in scope and affected African American neighborhoods across 
the nation:  
The availability of jobs and the values of homes depend on the availability of fairly priced 
credit and capital.  If credit becomes unavailable, then this damages the collateral and 
creditworthiness of the neighborhood, potentially leading to a vicious circle in which any 
lender interested in venturing into such an area is forced to assume significantly higher risks.  
The abandonment of areas by conventional financial institutions then leads to social 
problems that choke off more investment and lending281  
As in the case of Central City, with no neighborhood-specific institution to perform lending in 
Central City, both residents and businesses were left with few options to invest in their 
neighborhood.  This often led to payday loans and other predatory lending schemes that further 
reaped benefits from low-income neighborhoods.282   
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 In the late 1990s, the Trinity Episcopal Church and community-based organizations on O.C. 
Haley led the initiative to attract a community development credit union (CDCU).  Hope 
Community Credit Union opened in 2004 to cheers and high hopes, as The Times-Picayune front 
page‟s title trumpeted: “Many hope the first financial institution in a generation to set up shop on 
Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard is a sign of the area‟s rebirth.”283  Capitalized with deposits from 
local and regional banks, the credit union‟s mission focused on inexpensive personal loans and 
mortgages for Central City residents.   Several years later, reality tempered the high hopes for the 
CDCU.  One community leader remarked that people expected a lot more from the credit union.  
With limited funds to invest in neighborhoods, CDCUs rely on outside private capital sources, or 
small member deposits, for loans to low-income individuals and neighborhoods.284  Tellingly, the 
CCRA Plan from 2004 recommended that more private lending institutions must supplement the 
work of Hope Community Credit Union and provide equal access to services and assistance with 
financial literacy.285  Although it is unclear when another financial institution will locate in the 
neighborhood, Central City could realize CRA benefits if Congress passes long-overdue CRA 
reform.  Advocates for reform argue that the CRA could fix the problem of place-based banks so 
that neighborhoods can get investments from banks all over the country.286  
 
    Workforce development, retail, and the business incubator  
 Central City‟s unemployment rate steadily rose after WWII and continued to remain high for 
decades.  New Orleans‟ tourism economy contained most of the employed in low-wage jobs in the 
city and a large majority of Central City residents worked in these positions.287  Efforts to confront 
this generational problem started in the 1960s, but suffered from fragmented and shortsighted 
federal jobs programs that could not break the employment color line.288  Even in the 60s, Central 
City residents and leaders strived to create opportunities to build small businesses.  In 1969, Central 
City residents protested a white-owned grocery store called Opportunity Food Stores that charged 
notoriously high prices. “Organizers of the boycott want nothing less than ownership of the store by 
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the community,” however, “Black businessmen are vigorously attempting to buy their own 
businesses, but they simply lack the capital.”289  The national context continued to be bleak for 
African American businessmen, as they “face a wide variety of barriers and disadvantages in 
attempting to establish and grow businesses, especially when compared to whites….It was precisely 
because blacks had suffered from discrimination in credit, housing, employment, and other markets 
that they had accumulated less capital, less education, and less business experience, on average, than 
whites.”290   
 Planning efforts dating back to the Heritage Square Planning Project targeted retail as an 
opportunity for job growth, but persistent economic barriers prevented the full realization of 
African American business potential in the neighborhood.  The 1999 Plan noted the neighborhood 
inequity in private resources sparked by public investment: “while some neighborhoods such as 
Coliseum Square and Magazine Street are experiencing a renaissance of commerce and an increase in 
residential development, other areas of the District are plagued by vacancies, disinvestment and 
overall decay (Oretha Castle Haley).”291  These inequities come from the structural factors impeding 
revitalization and small business development in African American communities.   
 Central City leaders pushed ahead and continued efforts to spark retail and small business 
investment along O.C. Haley.  In 2003, Carol Bebelle from Ashé anticipated “black-owned 
businesses [to] start opening along” O.C. Haley and that “black tourists will seek them out when 
they visit the city.”292  The former executive director of the Oretha Castle Haley Merchants and 
Business Association‟s claimed that “the Central City community is clamoring for retail” like 
restaurants, boutiques, clothing stores, shoe stores, coffee shops, flower shops, and a bookstore.293  
These types of shops could lead to increases in property value and gentrification, so the Merchants 
and Business Association developed a plan for the nation‟s first community land trust for 
commercial real estate to appropriately deal with affordability problems and to curtail potential 
gentrification.  There is cause for concern from the academic literature that gentrification could lead 
to neighborhood fragmentation, displacement, and class antagonisms.294  Furthermore, 
segregation—as seen in Central City for generations—“plays a key role in depriving poor black 
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families of access to goods and services because it interacts with poverty to create neighborhood 
conditions that make it nearly impossible to sustain a viable retail sector.”295  This structural 
forewarning, especially in light of previous failures to develop an African American retail corridor, 
should be taken into consideration for how to overcome economic segregation and mitigate class 
antagonisms in Central City.   
 With the restaurant destination and workforce development anchor Café Reconcile as an 
example,296 Central City leaders planned for a business incubator before, during and after the CCRA 
Plan and have continued to advocate for minority small businesses venues.  Currently, the Good 
Work Network—located on O.C. Haley—offers business training and accounting help for small 
businesses.  Most recently, the New Orleans non-profit Idea Village initiated an ambitious business 
plan for a business incubator and building trades center on O.C. Haley and linked the plan to the 
UNOP plans recommendation for more incubators in the city.  The plan acknowledges the 
challenge “facing redevelopment in the City is to avoid patterns that concentrate poverty, perpetuate 
racial disparities, and obstruct access to employment opportunity.” 297   The plan envisions a “catalyst 
for reinvestment” sparked “by nurturing new business creation, building human capital and 
promoting the physical rebuilding of O.C. Haley Boulevard.”298  This focus on human resource 
development is “the foundation that must ultimately support American cities and their 
economies.”299  Without it, place-based strategies will likely overweigh concurrent efforts at 
developing people-based economies.  Unfortunately, as with so many other ambitious plans for 
Central City, this anchor has yet to be realized.   
 
    Mixed-income housing development and the Muses   
 Housing rehabilitation and development is critical to bring people back to Central City and 
to ensure the success of commercial corridors like O.C. Haley.  The most significant housing 
investment in the immediate O.C. Haley vicinity is the Muses, which recently opened more than 200 
mixed-income units.  On a parcel of land originally purposed for an Albertson‟s grocery store in the 
late 90s—which fell apart when Walmart located in the Garden District—the Gulf Coast Housing 
Partnership spearheaded the development and overcame significant opposition from nearby 
                                                 
295 Massey and Denton, 1993, p. 135  
296 Café Reconcile is a restaurant and culinary training institute for youth on O.C. Haley.  For more information, visit: 
http://reconcileneworleans.org/ 
297 Sutton, Stacey, Neighborhood Revitalization: Crafting a Catalyst for Change, Columbia University, 2007, p. 3.   
298 Ibid, p. 56 
299 Ross and Leigh, 2000, p. 378 
 65  
neighborhoods.  A neighborhood leader remarked, “now that the Muses project is built and people 
are moving in there…I don‟t see how it can‟t [be a catalyst].” However, it is unclear how the Muses 
and other developments fit into the cultural arts district plan for the area.   As another community 
leader noted, the housing developers in the neighborhood focus primarily on location attributes of 
Central City for investment potential and not the cultural aspects of revitalization.  Although this 
could jeopardize some culture-based efforts along O.C. Haley, developers acknowledge the larger 
market forces affecting investment in a community and can help to navigate difficult investment 
decisions to keep the revitalization afloat.  Even with some disagreement between community 
leaders and developers, there seems to be a consensus about finding the spark to reach Central City‟s 
turning point.   
 Although much of the revitalization efforts in Central City focus on O.C. Haley, the 
residential redevelopment along MLK is vitally important for the neighborhood‟s renaissance.  Just 
as community leaders identified Melpomene as a significant corridor in the 1970s because of the 
public housing, so too has MLK been at the center of mixed-income public housing redevelopment 
plans since the 1990s.  The 1999 plan identified public housing on MLK for redevelopment, with no 
mention of the citywide controversy around these redevelopments.300  The UNOP Plan, however, 
identified resident worries about loss of affordability in the neighborhood, and also provided vision 
on how to tie the MLK redevelopments to larger transportation routes and services that would 
integrate the MLK neighborhood with the city. 301  Many community leaders also openly support 
mixed-income redevelopment, one of which proclaimed that:  
“We don‟t want an all Black community; we want a diverse community.  We want people to 
see their capacity to grow.  So if it works out that we have poor people, we want poor people 
to be living next to and around people who are working class and middle class, and even 
upper economic class.” 
Nearby, the mixed-income Harmony Oaks community (formerly C.J. Peete or Magnolia) will likely 
serve as a focal point for further analysis of mixed-income redevelopment in Central City. 
 Although revitalized public housing promises new opportunities for residents and 
investment, there are significant limitations on the financing of mixed-income housing 
developments.  The market for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) is slow right now and 
federal deadlines for the expenditure of the tax credits approach within the year, threatening the 
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major public housing redevelopment along MLK.302  Although tax credits provide the vast majority 
of affordable units nationally, the complexity of the tool and its dependence on larger economic 
factors could affect further redevelopment. 303  Moreover, LIHTC success tends to rely on larger 
housing developments, limiting its use for further housing revitalization throughout the blighted 
neighborhoods of Central City.  Thus, it is unclear the direction or timeline of housing rehabilitation 
along the streets between major public housing redevelopments.  Much of the infill housing 
redevelopment remains in the hands of city officials, creative mission-driven nonprofits, and “new” 
methods for blight remediation.304  
 
    Public/private partnerships and the NORA headquarters  
 When the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA) decided to move their offices to 
O.C. Haley and invest millions of dollars in the boulevard for commercial and retail development, 
many thought it was finally time for the boulevard‟s renaissance.  Working in collaboration with 
several organizations in Central City, including the O.C. Haley Merchants and Business 
Association—a long-time advocate for a business and cultural district—NORA committed to 
relocating their main office on the boulevard as an anchor commercial building.   NORA committed 
several million dollars of public grants and loans matched by private investment to nine property 
developments along the corridor, including restaurants, office and retail space, and a live music 
venue.305  In what seems to be a dedication to the original intent of small African American business 
development along O.C. Haley, NORA expects to help fund cultural ventures that community-
based organizations support.  It is expected that these “initial investments are designed to have a 
snowball effect along O.C. Haley.”306  Despite these intentions, “The public sector developer has to 
mediate between public and private interests in order to find solutions that meet both an economic 
and a political bottom line.”307  This could, as before, threaten the viability of a boulevard featuring 
African American businesses dedicated to culture and the arts. 
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 This news was received with near unanimous cheer, with the exception of a slightly cynical 
Dryades YMCA executive director, who remarked that after 39 years, “I‟ve witnessed any number of 
attempts at revitalization, all of which for the most part have failed….Hopefully we can get it done 
this time.”308  Despite this, most leaders along O.C. Haley expected NORA‟s decision to be the final 
turnaround for the boulevard, which could then spark further investment along other corridors in 
Central City.  Now, nearly two years after the news broke about NORA‟s plans, it is a time of 
anticipation as organizations wait for the time when the revitalization reaches the turning point.  
Unfortunately, in a market downturn like the one right now, public and private sector investment in 
New Orleans and in cities around the country are highly dependent on federal resources.  Fickle 
policy and funding environments make these anchors unstable developments to rely on, especially in 
fiscally austere budget times like the present.  As one leader remarked, NORA is “slow coming” 
because “it‟s hard at City Hall” under the current budget cuts.  Once again, exogenous structural 
forces in the market, as well as fragmented policy and funding, constrain what could be the final 
turning point for O.C. Haley and Central City as a whole.  
 
Conclusion 
 Central City‟s turning point is still not fully realized, but there is fitful momentum in that 
direction.  In successive waves, O.C. Haley, and to a lesser degree MLK, have been poised to finally 
achieve a turning point for the neighborhood and residents.  Even with the languishing plans for 
singular and large-scale heritage anchor projects since the 1970s, Central City leaders turned to a 
legion of smaller-scale anchor projects that held together the vision of an African American cultural 
corridor.  Plans for the neighborhood grew over several decades and continued to evolve with 
changing funding environments and challenges that affect all structurally limited African American 
neighborhoods across the country.   This period of evolution allowed community-based 
organizations to create equitable plans for residents and minority businesses, as well as develop 
coalitions supportive of the revitalization in Central City.  One community leader grasped the 
longevity of the campaign for revitalization: “This is work that is done incrementally and half of it is 
learning what not to do.”   
 As an incremental process, planning for revitalization of an “African American Street” and a 
“Black Cultural Tourism District” continues to combat the structures that segregated Central City‟s 
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housing and commercial economies in the first place.  Even now, Central City still suffers from 
economic and residential segregation, a fact that can “largely be attributed to racism.”309  Full 
economic, political, and cultural “integration can be accomplished only through a comprehensive 
approach that diffuses progress throughout the entire community rather than concentrating it 
among a privileged few.”310  Continued commemorative and culture-based planning efforts in 
Central City will benefit from a broader perspective on how structural racism impacts community 
revitalization, anchor institutions, and the housing and commercial economies of their 
neighborhood.  
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5 
Conclusion 
 
Considering the historical legacy of impediments to revitalization, “streets of justice” cannot 
yet accurately describe the commemorative boulevards of O.C. Haley and MLK.  However, even 
when faced with plan and policy fragmentation, commemoration inspires resolve—even in the face 
of great hardship—and frames redevelopment decisions that prove valuable in planning for 
revitalization.  Central City‟s role in the national Civil Rights Movement is vital to the 
neighborhood‟s identity and supports the living history and culture of the community through 
ongoing battles for equality.  This case study of Central City makes evident that achieving justice in 
segregated African American communities benefits from planning strategies that integrate an 
analysis of historical, structural racism and the deeply embedded use of civil rights commemoration. 
 Land use tools developed in the early 20th century effectively prevented African American 
communities like Central City from fully integrating into the larger economy.  Racialized zoning and 
real estate economics created a durable template for segregation that prevented housing investment 
in Central City for generations.  In its ultimate expression, the redlining of the neighborhood from 
the 1930s onward—proved by HOLC maps that deemed investment “hazardous”—removed 
conventional lending markets for both housing and business development.    This toxic structural 
blend of public and private discrimination deepened segregation and poverty in Central City.  The 
tragic ironies of the Dryades Street commercial district serve as an example of the volatile interplay 
of economic structures.  Even as the Dryades Street Boycott momentarily bridged the bifurcated 
commercial economy in New Orleans‟ second largest business district, it likely hastened the decline 
of the street and, to some degree, the surrounding neighborhood.    
 Who defines history and for whom the history is relevant are contentious questions ongoing 
in Central City and communities throughout the United States.311  Inequitable political interest 
groups vie for control over the representation of history.  As shown throughout the country, those 
who are historically marginalized will often suffer continued inequality.312  In Central City, political 
and land use decisions, imbued with overt or covert racism, segregated the commemoration of the 
Civil Rights Movement, just as they influenced the segregation of housing and commercial 
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economies.   Even the hard-won African American political power during the 1960s-70s was 
insufficient to overcome the powerful structures affecting the neighborhood. 
  Even with these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, community-based organizations, 
Central City leaders, residents, and foundation partners persisted with revitalization and planning 
efforts for more than 40 years.  Through plan after plan, creative methods evolved to finance anchor 
projects and take advantage of opportunities for investment.  Central City framed revitalization, 
heritage tourism, and social justice work around the living culture of the neighborhood, rather than 
containing commemoration within the past.  After observing the failure of many public sector 
planning initiatives, Central City embarked on its own neighborhood-based planning initiative, 
following the trends of African American communities around the country that were equally fed up 
with the inequities of traditional planning methods.313 Although fragmented across numerous plans, 
Central City‟s vision for revitalization guides strategies with a strong sense of heritage and culture as 
assets. Continued neighborhood planning will benefit from formalized resident engagement in plan 
implementation, as laid out by the original CCRA plan, to empower residents in the transformation 
of their neighborhood.  This could ensure greater equity in future revitalization projects, mitigation 
of class tensions, and the distribution of redevelopment benefits to residents.   
 Commemorative boulevards in New Orleans had a clear impact on the revitalization efforts 
in Central City.  As such, they can be considered “change mechanisms” in efforts to overcome 
historic inequities, even when the boulevards remain within segregated neighborhoods.  Although 
negative brands of MLK, O.C. Haley, and Central City affected redevelopment decisions, the 
consistent and ubiquitous use of civil rights commemoration and representations of culture and 
living history brought significant investment potential and some important anchor projects.  As one 
of the first layers in planning for the revitalization of the neighborhood, civil rights commemoration 
demonstrated incredible versatility and sustainability in the face of political adversity and 
redevelopment challenges.  Community-based organizations, residents, planners, and leaders should 
continue to be inspired by and driven to use commemorative boulevards to their fullest potential. 
 While communities use commemoration as a means to revitalize and challenge the 
embedded structural inequities in American society, a continually evolving planning discipline 
wrestles with how to undo its negative impacts on African American communities.  Even with 
visionary ideas and designs, the fragmentation and inequities built into planning and public policy 
deeply diminish revitalization efforts in segregated communities.  As research shows, a turning point 
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for revitalization requires massive and concerted investment to overcome historic racism and 
disinvestment.314  The fragmented implementation of singular plans slows the pace of investment, 
and can derail productive changes to the local economy.  It is clear that neighborhoods like Central 
City will not change with one revolutionary plan.  Therefore, planners must integrate neighborhood-
based plans that highlight structural factors and important historical narratives (such as 
commemoration) into larger comprehensive plans to prevent fragmentation and disoriented 
resource distribution to marginalized communities.  Like the Civil Rights Movement itself, planning 
for the full integration of African American communities into the larger economy is a continually 
evolving process. 
 The commemoration of African American culture and struggles for civil rights is a powerful 
tool in revitalization and pushes the urban planning discipline to fundamentally challenge sources of 
inequity.  Commemorative boulevards profoundly shape plans for revitalization, as well as offer an 
important frame for how to make equitable decisions in redevelopment.  The planning discipline 
should not let this go unnoticed.   
 Many difficult questions remain unanswered in the revitalization of Central City.  How to 
reach the “turning point,” who benefits from that redevelopment, and how to integrate Central City 
into the larger economy and provide sustainable jobs and housing for residents are still open-ended.  
To reverse the intentional structural racism of the past will likely take many more decades, but the 
ongoing commemorative experiment in Central City shows promise to realize the “just” street and 
the “just” community.    
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Appendix A 
Figure A1. Home Owners Loan Corporation “Residential Security Map,” redlining the 
neighborhoods of New Orleans, circa 1930s.  Located in the cartographic and architectural holdings 
at the National Archives in College Park, MD 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Figure B1. Federal Housing Administration “Areas of Major Current Building Activity…in 1940” 
are the areas in New Orleans with a small or large star.  When compared to the redlining map in 
Appendix A, each of the areas of major building activity are located outside of redlined or 
“hazardous” areas of the city.  Central City is clearly avoided for major investment, as are other 
African-American and integrated neighborhoods.  Located in the cartographic and architectural 
holdings at the National Archives in College Park, MD. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Figure C1. Commemorative sculptures placed on MLK.  The above sculpture is placed at MLK and 
O.C. Haley and prompted considerable debate and derision.  The below bust of Dr. King was 
erected in 1981 and was financed entirely with community donations. 
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Appendix D 
 
Figure D1. Ashé Cultural Arts Center fliers for various events.   
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Figure D2. Festivals and cultural “gatherings” in Central City 
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Appendix E 
 
 
 
Figure E1. Murals along MLK on the Brown‟s Dairy property (Author‟s photo) 
 
 
 
 
 82  
 
Figure E2.  Mural by Shakor at MLK and O.C. Haley Boulevards, providing context for the 
significance of the abstract sculpture across the street and showing that the artist (Frank Hayden) 
was African American (Author‟s photo) 
 
Figure E3. Mural by Shakor at MLK and O.C. Haley Boulevards (Author‟s photo) 
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Figure E4. Detail of “Defend the Memory” MLK mural by Shakor, urging nonviolence and peace, 
in partnership with Ashe Cultural Arts Center (Author‟s photo) 
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Appendix F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure F1.  National civil rights heritage tour that includes New Orleans
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Appendix G 
 
Figure G1.  Petition to locate the Louisiana State Civil Rights Museum on Oretha Castle 
Haley Boulevard.
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